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Tuvalu, and Wallis and Futuna are  
not included in this issue.
Cook Islands
The year under review was a pivotal 
one as the Cook Islands celebrated its 
fiftieth anniversary of independence. 
Over the last twelve months, immedi-
ate and longer-term concerns have 
seen old relationships revisited and 
new ones forged. In this review, partic-
ular attention is given to highlighting 
the leadership of women in advanc-
ing the Cook Islands across different 
sectors and issues as political powers 
continue to shift and take hold.
Although women are increasingly 
elected and appointed as parliamen-
tarians, heads of government depart-
ments, chairs and directors of statu-
tory bodies and private entities, and 
customary titleholders, there appears 
to be little progress made toward 
transforming the gendered nature of 
Cook Islands politics. Indeed, despite 
women’s making up approximately 
50 percent of the country’s popula-
tion and positions held in the public 
service, their representation remains 
low across positions of authority and 
leadership (Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Management 2012; Minis-
try of Internal Affairs 2011). 
Nevertheless, key appointments 
have been made this year. Six women 
were appointed as heads of minis-
tries among the thirteen government 
departments. They include the first-
time appointment of seasoned public 
servants who have worked their way 
up the ranks. Tepaeru Herrmann was 
appointed secretary of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Immigration, and 
Gail Townsend replaced the retiring 
secretary of the Ministry of Education, 
Sharyn Paio. Reappointments included 
Elizabeth Wright-Koteka as chief of 
staff for the Office of the Prime Min-
ister, Elizabeth Iro as secretary of the 
Ministry of Health, Bredina Drollett 
as secretary of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, and Daphne Ringi as chief 
executive officer of the Office of the 
Public Service Commissioner (opsc 
2015). 
This year also saw Teremoana 
Yala appointed as Cook Islands’ high 
commissioner to New Zealand. With 
thirty-five years of public service 
experience, including fourteen years 
as a senior official at the Cook Islands 
High Commission in New Zealand, 
Yala is very familiar with Cook 
Islands’ development and diplomatic 
representation needs (cin, 3 June 
2016). Although not the first woman 
to be appointed to the position, she is 
the first to take up the office; tradi-
tional leader and former head of the 
Koutu Nui (traditional leaders group) 
Te Tika Mataiapo Dorice Reid was 
announced in April 2011 to take up 
the role but passed away unexpect-
edly before being able to assume the 
appointment (cin, 23 June 2011).
A less obvious but nevertheless 
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noteworthy appointment was also 
made with Caren Rangi taking up a 
directorship on the Board of Direc-
tors for the Cook Islands Investment 
Corporation (ciic). Based in New 
Zealand and with ties to Northern and 
Southern group islands in the Cooks, 
she holds a range of community and 
national level governance roles. She is 
the national president of pacifica Inc, 
a pan-Pacific women’s organization in 
New Zealand, and serves as a board 
member of the Creative New Zealand 
Arts Council as well as the Pacific 
Homecare Services and Charities Reg-
istration Board (pacifica Inc 2016). 
Responsible for the oversight of all 
government assets including land and 
a number of state-owned enterprises, 
ciic makes use of Rangi’s expertise in 
attending to its affairs. These include 
the development of seabed minerals 
and preparation of the contract with 
the United Nations International Sea-
bed Authority, which gives the country 
mineral rights to a specified area of its 
exclusive economic zone, and a joint-
venture agreement with gsr (Global 
Sea Mineral Resources nv). This 
allows the Belgium-based private com-
pany the opportunity to explore and 
mine the designated area held by the 
Cook Islands (ciic, 15 July 2016; cin, 
26 July 2016). Caren Rangi’s appoint-
ment can be seen as a reflection of 
the government’s openness to looking 
beyond its geographical boundaries in 
making use of skilled Cook Islanders 
to provide expertise for the country.
As an example of Cook Islands 
women’s leadership outside of the 
country, Teresa Manarangi-Trott was 
appointed to the new Specialist Sub-
Committee for Regionalism support-
ing the Pacific Islands Forum Secre-
tariat implementation of the Pacific 
Regionalism framework (cin, 6 May 
2015). She provides the committee 
with a small island states perspective, 
supported by her private sector and 
economic development experience. 
Having served on the Cook Islands 
Tourism Corporation Board of Direc-
tors for ten years, she is credited with 
transforming the agency’s financial 
management (cin, 3 Nov 2015). As 
an executive member of the national 
 private sector organization, the 
 Chamber of Commerce, she has also 
been instrumental in the capacity 
development of local businesses (cin, 
21 Sept 2015). 
Recognition can also be given to 
the country’s young women. Despite 
the controversy between the legiti-
macy of two pageant associations, 
Natalia Short was crowned one of two 
Miss Cook Islands. Having won the 
Miss Cook Islands Association title, 
Natalia has been an ambassador for 
key causes. A business management 
graduate, she attended the General 
Assembly of the Red Cross in Geneva 
as the youth ambassador of the Cook 
Islands Red Cross. She also supported 
the End the Violence campaign as 
the #ENDtheviolence Ambassador 
for Punanga Tauturu, a Cook Islands 
women’s voluntary organization (cin, 
30 April 2016). 
But concern about women’s par-
ticipation in politics is not just about 
increasing the numbers in leadership 
positions. As one of four women mem-
bers of Parliament (mps), Democratic 
Party mp for Titikaveka Selina Napa is 
active in her parliamentary work. She 
is a member of the select committee 
for the Family Law bill, which is set to 
table overhauled and outdated family 
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laws. More protection for survivors of 
sexual offenses is a part of the bill; this 
includes criminalizing marital rape, 
which is not an offense in current law. 
After two separate incidents of rape 
against young women were reported, 
and drawing on the 2014 report on 
family health and safety (Te Marae 
Ora and others 2014), Napa stated 
that “we are such a small nation, but 
the figures advise us that one in three 
women are subjected to some form 
of physical and sexual abuse” (cin, 
17 March 2016). Napa has called on 
all parliamentarians to support the 
bill, which is waiting to be tabled in 
 Parliament. 
This year also saw a woman chal-
lenge the prime minister’s position for 
the first time. Rose Brown, mp for the 
Teenui-Mapumai electorate in Atiu, 
became central to continued political 
maneuverings within the country and 
a failed coup to oust the current prime 
minister and his government. After 
winning her seat in the 2014 election, 
first-time mp Brown crossed the floor 
to join the Opposition coalition. In a 
bold move, the Opposition coalition 
sought to remove the Cook Islands 
Party (cip) government when Parlia-
ment retired from its 17 June 2016 
sitting. The Opposition members met 
at Parliament on Monday 20 June and 
asserted that the parliamentary session 
that ended on the previous Friday had 
not followed the procedure correctly, 
whereby no proper resolution to close 
the sitting was carried. Being of the 
view that Parliament was still in ses-
sion, the members undertook to hold 
a no-confidence vote against Prime 
Minister Henry Puna, who flew out 
of the country to attend the inaugural 
Small Island States meeting being held 
outside of the Pacific Islands Forum 
leaders group in Palau (pir, 26 June 
2016). 
The parliamentary session was 
chaired by Brown, the Cook Islands 
Party’s only woman member and 
deputy Speaker of the House, and 
attended by the Opposition members. 
Democratic Party mp Albert Nicho-
las, who last year crossed the floor 
to take up a cabinet position with 
the cip government, also attended 
the session (cin, 22 June 2016). The 
members subsequently voted Brown as 
the prime minister; however, she was 
not sworn in by Queen’s Representa-
tive Tom Marsters. He upheld Speaker 
of the House Niki Rattle’s ruling of 
adjourning Parliament sine die (with-
out a designated future date) (Pearl-
man 2016). While Brown may not 
be given the accolade of first woman 
prime minister, she is the first woman 
to be nominated by an Opposition 
coalition to be sworn in to the highest 
office in the Cook Islands.
In speaking out about the move to 
change the government, mp Brown as 
the current leader of the Opposition 
coalition expressed her shock at the 
dirty politics and failure of all politi-
cians over the years to make neces-
sary political reforms. In pointing out 
that the government has sat for only 
ninety-three days in the last five years, 
Brown is looking for political commit-
ment to make changes. She stated, “I 
am not interested in the power, I am 
interested in helping my people, no 
matter what they think about politics 
or the people who continue to feed 
off the system” (cin, 30 July 2016). 
Elected by the Democratic and One 
Cook Islands parties “as the leader of 
Unity in Parliament not as the leader 
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of the opposition,” Brown aspires 
to have the Cook Islands Party join 
and connect with efforts for a “real 
government of national unity.” This 
intention is particularly poignant at 
this time as Brown reported that the 
cip executive had recently agreed to 
Henry Puna’s stepping down as prime 
minister (cin, 30 July 2016). Over-
all, the diverse leadership of women 
expressed in the year under review 
highlights the quality of women’s 
participation in the country’s affairs 
despite the ongoing everyday chal-
lenges women face and the need for 
increased representation locally and 
further afield.
The celebratory nature of this 
year culminated on 4 August 2015 
with the official commemoration of 
the country’s fiftieth anniversary of 
self-governance. The proceedings took 
place with full island-style ceremony 
and entertainment. Attended by a 
wide range of local and international 
dignitaries, the warm, cloudless day 
included commemorative speeches, a 
religious dedication, flag raising, cake 
cutting, and cultural performances. 
A flyover by an Air New Zealand 
 commercial flight, a twenty-one-gun 
salute from a New Zealand navy 
 vessel, and gift giving to the diplo-
matic corps also took place. In his 
Constitution Day speech, the prime 
minister acknowledged the challenges 
the country has faced in its journey 
as a nation. He paid homage to past 
leaders and partners who have shared 
and shaped the journey so far. Look-
ing to the future, Puna noted that the 
key lies in embracing a cohesive and 
inclusive approach, as in the vision of 
the Cook Islands’ first premier, Papa 
Arapati Henry, in which “no one in 
the tribe is left behind, and no one in 
the village is forgotten” (Cook Islands 
Sun 2015). 
In reflecting on these words in real 
terms, the Cook Islands examined its 
relationship with its associated state 
partner, New Zealand. While the 
Cook Islands remains responsible for 
its domestic and foreign affairs, New 
Zealand provides development assis-
tance through a traditional donor-aid 
recipient relationship. In 2015, a new 
aid agreement was signed between 
the Cook Islands and New Zealand. 
The performance-based agreement 
is touted as a historic arrangement 
because of the shift from project-based 
to the higher aid modality of budget 
support. This modality will see a 
working group set up, consisting of 
the two countries’ respective govern-
ment representatives, to engage in 
higher-level domestic policy dialogue 
rather than deal with the opera-
tional details of projects (cin, 7 Nov 
2015). On the one hand, this kind 
of  modality favors the country-own-
ership  principle with the use of the 
Cook Islands’ own country systems to 
manage external development activi-
ties and funds. On the other hand, 
with increased levels of policy influ-
ence accorded a donor, budget support 
can be seen as eroding small island 
developing state sovereignty, whereby 
its policy space shrinks as external 
actors and mechanisms get involved 
in a country’s decision making (Khan 
2007; unctad 2014). Having this 
particular development partner at the 
Cook Islands’ policy-making table in 
this way reflects an “inverse sover-
eignty” effect (Murray and Overton 
2011) wherein such a policy  dialogue 
arrangement can be seen as an 
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increased demand and conditionality 
placed on the Cook Islands. 
During a year that has also been 
about celebrating the new and not 
just what has happened over the past 
fifty years, another relationship has 
also taken a notable historic turn. In 
October 2015, a signing ceremony 
took place between the Cook Islands 
government and Te Kīngitanga (the 
King Movement) at Tūrangawaewae 
Marae, in Ngāruwāhia in New 
Zealand. This Koreromotu (cultural 
 covenant) gives recognition to the 
“historical, ancestral and cultural ties 
between the Maori people of the Cook 
Islands and Aotearoa” (cin, 27 Oct 
2015). Areas of cooperation include 
“environmental issues including 
freshwater, climate change and fisher-
ies; economic development including 
investment and commercial oppor-
tunities; social and cultural issues 
including language preservation and 
development and health and social 
well-being” (cin, 27 Oct 2015). Seen 
as strengthening ancestral ties and 
acknowledging the indigenous author-
ity of both countries, the covenant 
also reflects the ability of the Cook 
Islands government to engage in part-
nerships that go beyond its sovereign 
state–defined relationship with the 
New Zealand government. 
Closer to home, the government 
took to challenging its own indigenous 
leaders, the Ui Ariki. Prime Minister 
Puna invited the Ui Ariki to consider 
their roles, functions, and contribu-
tions to their tribes and the country 
as a whole in the twenty-first century 
before seeking more funding from 
the government. Puna pointed to the 
prolonged absenteeism of chiefs who 
reside overseas and are not physically 
resident in the Cook Islands to lead, 
serve, and live among their people as a 
contributing factor to the diminishing 
mana (authority) of the Ui Ariki (cin, 
25 July 2016). 
There are 23 Ariki in the Cook 
Islands, with 16 sworn in as members 
of the constitutionally formed Are 
Ariki (House of Traditional Chiefs). 
This is a parliamentary body that 
provides advice to the government on 
a range of issues. In September 2015, 
the Are Ariki undertook its first-ever 
tour of New Zealand and Australia 
since it was formed in 1966 (Radio 
New Zealand 2015). Taking advan-
tage of this opportunity to connect 
and consult with Cook Islands com-
munities, they held discussions on 
a range of matters. These included 
absentee titleholders; the role of 
the Aronga Mana (group of chiefs, 
sub-chiefs and heads of families) in 
granting Cook Islands residency to 
foreign nationals; and the occupation 
rights and vesting orders related to 
the land-tenure system (cin, 21 Sept 
2015). Also on the agenda were the 
fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the 
establishment of the House of Ariki 
that would take place in 2016.
The three-year wait for Teina 
Bishop, the leader of the One Cook 
Islands Party, to have his day in court 
on corruption charges came to an end 
during this year of review. In Novem-
ber 2015, Chief Justice Thomas 
Weston granted leave to prosecute 
the former cabinet minister on two 
charges of bribery and corruption 
(cin, 10 Nov 2015). Bishop was found 
guilty of corruption when he received 
funds from a subsidiary of Chinese 
fishing company Luen Thai toward 
the purchase of hotel accommodations 
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in Aitutaki. Bishop’s sentencing will 
take place in August 2016. He could 
face jail time of up to fourteen years, 
ending his seventeen years of service 
as a member of Parliament and forcing 
another by-election to be held for the 
Arutanga-Nikaupara-Reureu elector-
ate in Aitutaki (cin, 30 July 2016). 
In the face of the impending 
prosecution and subsequent verdict, 
Bishop continued to lobby to resolve 
marine resources management issues, 
which remained active throughout 
the year. Following on from the 2015 
public debate and petition opposing 
purse seine fishing, the prime min-
ister agreed with Bishop, who was 
Opposition coalition leader at the 
time, to establish a select committee 
to examine the issues, including the 
anti–purse seining petition especially 
concerned with the use of fish-aggre-
gating devices (fads) (cin, 18 May 
2016). The signing of the Sustainable 
Fisheries Partnership Agreement with 
the European Union is also proving to 
be a controversial part of the debate. 
Advice from Foreign Affairs Secretary 
Tepaeru Herrmann called for removal 
of a clause that was interpreted as 
undermining the government’s author-
ity: “This kind of text is objectionable 
and Pacific Islands countries have 
collectively resisted long and hard 
against such text appearing in any 
kind of access arrangement or Treaty 
Convention language in this region” 
(cin, 7 June 2016). However, the 
advice was considered unfounded or 
lacking in substance according to the 
European Union and the Ministry of 
Marine Resources (cin, 7 June 2016), 
with the European Union ratifying 
the agreement. The cabinet-endorsed 
agreement is now waiting for the 
signature of the prime minister as the 
minister of marine resources. 
Sadly, this year also saw the pass-
ing of two prominent artists who, 
through their creative work, reflected 
their dedication and advocacy for 
Cook Islands culture and authority. 
From Atiu and Rarotonga, Ian George 
worked as an educator and was a 
well-known painter and sculptor. In 
particular, he drew on Oceanic totems 
such as Tangaroa (God of the Sea) to 
provoke comment on the loss of Cook 
Islands and Pacific indigenous control 
and cultural imperialism (Art Associ-
ates 2016). 
Eruera Te Whiti Nia was a film-
maker, sculptor, activist, and tradi-
tional titleholder from Ngati Makea 
in Rarotonga and Te Ati Awa in 
New Zealand. He safeguarded Cook 
Islands culture through his art, which 
included his sculptural and spatial 
responses to the concept of the Are 
Korero (house of history and learn-
ing) within the paepae Ariki (chief’s 
palace) of Taputapuatea in Rarotonga 
(Nia 2010). He protested for politi-
cal change as a member of Nga Tama 
Toa (an indigenous activist group as 
part of the Māori sovereignty and land 
rights movements of the 1970s and 
1980s in New Zealand) (Ngā Taonga 
2016; cin, 13 June 2016). Both men 
were strong advocates for the collabo-
ration of cultural and artistic efforts 
across Oceania. 
Overall, the half-century milestone 
of independence was celebrated with 
much fanfare. The year’s events have 
shown that old and new relationships 
can be established, redefined, and 
advanced. While the economic, social, 
cultural, and environmental matters 
continue to require attention, the 
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meaningful contribution of the coun-
try’s women in these matters has been 
highlighted. Calls for political reform 
still remain at the forefront of much 
public opinion. It would seem timely 
then that a woman prime minister 
lead the 2017 elections as an option 
to  pursue an inclusive approach where 
no one is to be left behind and forgot-
ten.
christina newport
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French Polynesia
In the often-turbulent recent politi-
cal history of French Polynesia, the 
year under review was a relatively 
calm one. Against all odds, Edouard 
Fritch consolidated his power as the 
country’s president, transforming his 
tenuous tenure in office into one based 
on a comparatively solid majority, and 
uniting under his leadership all politi-
cal forces that oppose both indepen-
dence and Fritch’s predecessor Gaston 
Flosse. Meanwhile, for the first time 
in over a decade, the country hosted a 
French presidential visit, which made 
some hopeful impressions, but at the 
same time the French government con-
tinues to stubbornly refuse to engage 
with United Nations institutions to 
work with them toward the country’s 
decolonization. 
The review period started with 
yet another unfortunate change in 
the local media landscape. In August 
2015, at the end of the summer break 
(as one of its many anachronistic 
colonial absurdities, French Polyne-
sia follows the French metropolitan 
calendar and is thus the only country 
in the southern hemisphere to have its 
long “summer vacation” during the 
pleasant austral winter and not during 
the very hot season at the beginning 
of the year), the formerly monthly 
news magazine Tahiti Pacifique (tpm) 
became a weekly, after having been 
sold by its founder and editor Alex 
W du Prel to local Chinese business 
tycoon Albert Moux, whose company 
Fenua Communication already owns 
the weekday newspaper Tahiti-Infos. 
Unsurprisingly this change in owner-
ship transformed tpm, once feared 
by local oligarchs for its investigative 
reporting and scathing editorials, into 
a more docile publication. While du 
Prel continues to write good editori-
als occasionally and the magazine 
still contains investigative articles, the 
publication has clearly become more 
mainstream and now contains a lot 
of trivia, missing some of the intellec-
tual depth of the old monthly edition. 
Also, for outsiders, the both reliable 
and manageable chronicle of impor-
tant political and social events that 
tpm provided is being missed.
What remained the dominant 
topic in local politics for the first half 
of the review period, however, was 
the ongoing power struggle between 
President Edouard Fritch and his 
predecessor, Gaston Flosse, until it 
was essentially won by the former 
in early 2016. In September 2014, 
when Flosse was removed from office 
because of a definitive conviction in a 
corruption case, his longtime confi-
dant and former son-in-law Fritch had 
routinely taken over the presidency 
with the understanding that Flosse 
would continue to hold the reins of 
power from behind the scenes. Fritch, 
however, developed his own taste for 
political power, and tensions between 
the two soon become apparent. In 
May 2015, the majority party Taho-
eraa Huiraatira split when Fritch 
formed his own caucus in the local 
assembly named Tapura Huiraatira, 
and on Flosse’s order all members of 
the new formation were expelled from 
Tahoeraa. Fritch subsequently formed 
a minority coalition government with 
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the small anti-independence opposi-
tion party A Tia Porinetia (atp), while 
Flosse’s “rump-Tahoeraa” several 
times attempted to block the govern-
ment by withholding support in criti-
cal budgetary votes. However, Flosse 
failed in efforts to enlist the support 
of the pro-independence Union Pour 
La Démocratie (upld), which would 
have been necessary to create a new 
majority and overthrow Fritch in a 
no-confidence vote.
Meanwhile, the process of formally 
splitting Tahoeraa into two mutu-
ally hostile organizations was far 
from over, as both factions attempted 
to gain control over the party as a 
whole. After an unsuccessful attempt 
by Flosse to oust Fritch from Taho-
eraa, in which he continued to hold 
the vice presidency, in mid-August 
2015, Fritch fought back and filed a 
complaint with the local courts ask-
ing them to declare Flosse removed 
from the party’s leadership, arguing 
that as a convicted felon he cannot be 
Tahoeraa’s chairman according to the 
party’s statutes (ti, 15 Aug 2015). 
The complaint dragged along 
through the notoriously slow and 
 inefficient court system and hear-
ings were several times postponed 
(ti, 12 Oct 2015), but it was soon 
rendered obsolete by more solid 
political maneuvers to consolidate 
Fritch’s power outside of Tahoeraa. 
By mid-November, Assembly Speaker 
Marcel Tuihani, second-in-command 
within the Flosse loyalist “rump-Taho-
eraa,” opined in an interview in Tahiti 
Pacifique that between Fritch and his 
party, “reconciliation was no longer 
conceivable” (tpm, 13 Nov 2015). 
Following one of the most basic 
“natural laws” of local politics—
namely, that assembly backbenchers 
are tempted to cross the floor toward 
whichever political formation is in 
power if some types of advantages 
or minor government positions are 
offered to them or their family mem-
bers—Fritch was able to extend his 
majority throughout the remainder of 
the year. Starting off with 16 members 
in June, over the following months 
Tapura Huiraatira was able to woo 5 
more Tahoeraa members into turn-
ing their back on Flosse and joining 
them. Finally, in the first week of 
December, even one of upld’s mem-
bers, Joëlle Frébault of the Marquesas 
Islands, defected to the government 
side, which, including the 8 seats of 
Tapura’s coalition partner atp, now 
added up to 29 seats—a bare but 
workable majority that no longer 
necessitated any tradeoffs to gain 
upld’s tacit support in passing laws 
or making budgetary appropriations. 
Consequently, on 9 December Tapura 
and atp merged into a common cau-
cus named Rassemblement pour une 
Majorité Autonomiste (autonomiste 
in local political discourse meaning in 
support of the current political system 
but opposed to independence; ti, 
7 Dec 2015; dt, 9 Dec 2015). 
As the next step, Fritch and atp 
leader Teva Rohfritsch prepared the 
merger of the parties themselves, 
implying that the president had 
definitively given up any attempts to 
wrest control over Tahoeraa from 
Flosse. As Fritch’s group and atp 
were essentially identical in terms of 
their platforms—opposing both Flosse 
and independence—the merger was 
less an issue of harmonizing politi-
cal ideas than of trading offices and 
posts within the hierarchy of the new 
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party. Finally, on 20 February 2016, 
the merger was formalized during a 
founding convention in the Aorai Tini 
Hau congress hall in Pirae, Fritch’s 
home municipality, where he is the 
mayor. Attended by at least 8,000 
people, the convention confirmed the 
new party’s name as Tapura Huiraa-
tira, its logo and color (red), as well as 
its basic platform. The party claims to 
stand for more transparency and hon-
esty in politics and to support innova-
tion and reform (ti, 20 Feb 2016).
While the latter sounds good, it 
seems rather doubtful whether the 
party seriously stands for these values, 
as Fritch’s tactics of majority forma-
tion in the assembly are virtually 
indistinguishable from those of earlier 
majorities under former presidents 
Flosse, Temaru, and Tong Sang. Fur-
thermore, the leading team of Tapura 
Huiraatira consists almost exclusively 
of former Tahoeraa cadres—unsurpris-
ingly so, since just like Tapura, atp 
and its predecessor parties are virtually 
all earlier splits from Tahoeraa arising 
from personal differences with Flosse. 
A truly innovative political movement 
that seriously aims at political reforms 
has been needed for many years but 
currently seems nowhere in sight. 
But Fritch’s success in wresting 
power from Flosse should not be 
misinterpreted as a definitive defeat of 
Tahoeraa, as the “Old Lion” and his 
party are far from having sunk into 
obscurity. With eighteen members, 
Tahoeraa still has the second largest 
caucus in the assembly, and in Faaa 
on 28 November, Tahoeraa held its 
party convention, which was also well 
attended by thousands of delegates 
(dt, 30 Nov 2015). With his crude 
but electorally successful populist 
discourse appealing to nostalgia of 
the “good old times” when Flosse 
was president (occasionally laced with 
Tahitian nationalist and anticolonial 
rhetoric to woo voters who would 
otherwise support upld), the octo-
genarian but vital Flosse might well 
have yet another comeback in the next 
elections in 2018. 
On the other hand, the more 
consistently anticolonial, “sovereign-
tist” upld (the term independence 
having been increasingly replaced by 
sovereignty in their discourse) is now 
only the third-ranked political force, 
holding ten assembly seats. But despite 
having lost significant numbers of 
votes in the last territorial election as 
well as several municipalities in the 
town council elections that followed, 
upld still has large numbers of core 
supporters, among rural and working-
class Tahitians as well as urban intel-
lectuals, along with an unbreakable, 
broad popular majority in the city of 
Faaa, the country’s largest municipal-
ity, where Temaru has been mayor 
since 1983. The triumph of having 
succeeded in mobilizing the majority 
of UN member states to the country’s 
reinscription on the list of non-self-
governing territories (nsgts) in 2013 
was certainly no small achievement 
and has helped to consolidate sup-
port among the party’s followers. 
While many youths see upld as just as 
dominated by a fossilized oligarchy of 
old-generation political leaders as the 
pro-French parties, there are also some 
rising stars within the sovereigntist 
movement, including Moetai Broth-
erson, a young intellectual gaining 
prominence as a confidant and pos-
sible successor to Oscar Temaru. 
In all these political developments, 
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women play an increasingly important 
role, a role that was certainly never 
as pronounced during the last century 
and a half or so. As in other Eastern 
Polynesian societies, women in leader-
ship positions were quite prevalent 
during the nineteenth century in 
several of the islands that are now part 
of French Polynesia. Queen Pomare 
IV of Tahiti (who reigned 1827–1877) 
is quite well known, but many of the 
monarchs of the smaller kingdoms in 
the Leeward and Austral Islands prior 
to their colonization by France were 
female as well (Gunson 1987). While 
in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries all these monarchies 
were formally dissolved and replaced 
with the patriarchic colonial regime of 
France, some aspects survived far into 
the 1900s, and matriarchs of promi-
nent local families, usually of chiefly 
descent, retained influence in local 
politics throughout the twentieth cen-
tury. One such example was Tuianu Le 
Gayic (1922–1995), a descendant of 
the Teva chiefly family, who as mayor 
of Papara on Tahiti’s southern coast 
during most of the 1980s and 1990s 
was one of the first women to lead a 
local municipality. Nonetheless, such 
public political careers were the excep-
tion for women, and electoral politics 
on the territorial level remained fairly 
exclusively men’s domain until the 
turn of the twenty-first century. 
In 2000, however, the French 
national legislature passed a gender 
parity law that radically changed 
that situation. From that year on, all 
party lists for the election of assembly 
members were required to alternate 
between male and female candidates 
(Government of France 2000), based 
on an older law requiring the same for 
French regional elections. As French 
Polynesia has an electoral system of 
proportional representation, the new 
law resulted in a dramatic increase 
in the number of female assembly 
members, from only a few to almost 
50 percent after the 2001 election, 
the first conducted under the new 
law. That year, the new assembly 
also elected its first female speaker, 
Lucette Taero (Tahoeraa, in office 
2001–2004). 
Of course, being enforced by a 
law from the outside, the new situa-
tion did not at first correspond to real 
distributions of power, and a male 
candidate headed virtually every party 
list in 2001. With the small number 
of overall seats in the assembly and 
the fragmentation of the political 
landscape, this meant that the actual 
proportion of women in the assembly 
was still significantly less than half. In 
the long run, however, a trickle-down 
effect could be observed, and the 
gender parity law has contributed to 
raising the profile of female participa-
tion in politics. For the 2004 elec-
tions, a significant number of party 
lists had female head candidates, and 
there have been two small political 
parties created and lead by women—
Nicole Bouteau’s No Oe E Te Nunaa, 
and Sandra Levy-Agami’s Te Mana 
Toa—both founded in the first decade 
of this century and at one point each 
holding one assembly seat. Since the 
early 2000s, there has also been an 
increase in the number of municipali-
ties headed by female mayors. How-
ever, as in most other Pacific Island 
societies, top leadership positions are 
still difficult for women to achieve, 
and none of the major political parties 
has yet had a chairwoman or a female 
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candidate for the country’s presidency. 
Even Taero, who was not very popular 
as assembly Speaker, did not pursue a 
career of higher political offices after-
ward, and so far all her successors as 
Speaker have been male. 
While gender parity is far from 
achieved, the country faces a variety 
of other statistical challenges as well. 
According to the most recent census, 
there are more than 271,000 inhabi-
tants (ti, 31 Aug 2015). This figure 
makes one worry about the carrying 
capacity of the islands—less so on 
the outer islands, but certainly on 
Tahiti, where about two-thirds of the 
population lives. While the return of 
outer-island people from urban Tahiti 
to their home archipelagos has been 
increasing, the process of urbaniza-
tion of more and more parts of the 
coastal plain of the main island as 
well as some of its valleys and ridges 
is continuing as well. Since fertility 
rates have lowered to an average of 
fewer than two children per woman, 
the ongoing population increase (up 
from about 250,000 a decade ago) is 
most likely due to increasing French 
immigration, even though the statistics 
say that more people are leaving the 
territory than moving in. The absence 
of ethnic statistics since 1988 makes it 
hard to clarify, but it appears the out-
migrants are mainly indigenous Tahi-
tians while the immigrants are chiefly 
French. In comparison, independent or 
fully self-governing Polynesian coun-
tries like Sāmoa or the Cook Islands 
have either a stable or a decreasing 
population, because out-migration 
of Islanders there is balanced only 
by natural growth of the domestic 
population and not by any significant 
foreign immigration. The worries 
that have been expressed by pro-
independence activists for many years 
about the country being “invaded” 
by French settlers are thus most likely 
justified to some degree. 
Population increases on com-
paratively small islands lead to an 
increased scarcity of land, and thus 
inevitably to conflicts about land 
titles. For many years, the local court 
has been inundated with land cases, 
many of which take years or decades 
to be resolved, if at all. In the hope of 
speeding up some of these cases, the 
French Ministry of Justice announced 
the creation of a separate land court in 
January 2015, after the idea had been 
contemplated for quite a while (ti, 12 
Jan 2015). Later in 2015, it became 
clear that this time the land court was 
indeed a serious project, as the French 
state acquired the property of the 
former psychiatric hospital complex 
at Vaiami in western Papeete (ti, 23 
June 2015), and later it was officially 
announced that the land court would 
be headquartered there (ti, 15 Sept 
2015). Construction and remodeling 
is to begin in September 2016 and 
the court is to be operational in early 
2017.
The land court is a controversial 
project, however, since many Tahitian 
land rights activists dispute whether 
French law and French courts have 
jurisdiction over the matter in the first 
place. Indeed, when King Pomare V 
and several district chiefs of Tahiti 
signed the annexation agreement 
between the Kingdom of Tahiti and 
France in 1880, a clause explicitly 
exempted land matters from the 
transfer of authority and reserved 
these to be judged by Tahitian courts. 
Unsurprisingly, in reaction to the land 
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court announcement, heir apparent 
of the Pomare dynasty Teriihinoiatua 
Joinville Pomare, speaking for many 
like-minded activists, reiterated his 
long-standing demand for the creation 
of customary councils to deal with 
land disputes under Tahitian custom-
ary law instead (ti, 13 Jan 2015).
The intrusion of French colonial 
legislation into local society and its 
harmful effect on Polynesian ways 
of living was nowhere as evident as 
in a French metropolitan law made 
applicable to the country in August 
2015. This law, which prohibits 
payments in cash over 119,300 cfp 
francs (us$1,115) immediately created 
a variety of problems on the outer 
islands, where most people have no 
bank accounts—as on many of the 
smaller islands there is no bank—and 
receive their wages or salaries in 
cash, which they keep at home. These 
people typically need to pay more than 
119,300 cfp francs in cash occasion-
ally, for example, to purchase larger 
items such as vehicles, agricultural 
and fishing machinery, or boats, or 
to pay for their repair (ti, 31 Aug 
2015). Ostensibly passed as a measure 
against money laundering, the law 
might make some sense in France, but 
it clearly is an absurdity in French 
Polynesia, or any Pacific country with 
small outer islands, for that matter. 
Another example of the effects of 
colonial policies (both French and 
local) is the negligent way the authori-
ties deal with the new mosquito-borne 
viral diseases that increasingly ravage 
the Pacific Islands. Dengue fever, the 
oldest of those, coming to the coun-
try in repeated epidemics since the 
1980s, has been researched for several 
decades, and in 2015 a vaccination 
finally became available. The vaccine 
has been authorized in Mexico, but 
not yet in French Polynesia, because 
the French permit for the product is 
still pending (ti, 9 Dec 2015). Preven-
tion of a tropical disease like dengue 
is a low priority for French health 
bureaucrats, even though it is a high 
priority for the tropical overseas ter-
ritories, which once again get the short 
end of the deal.
One of the more recently intro-
duced mosquito-borne infections, the 
Zika virus, became a global pandemic 
in 2015–2016, to the point of raising 
concerns at the United Nations and 
the World Health Organization. When 
the epidemic hit French Polynesia in 
2013–2014, it was considered rather 
harmless compared to dengue and to 
chikungunya, the other new virus, as 
symptoms were milder and no fatali-
ties occurred. But later a correlation 
was established between an unusu-
ally high occurrence of microcephaly 
(smaller-than-normal heads) among 
babies born during the French Poly-
nesia Zika epidemic, which alerted 
health authorities worldwide to the 
danger of the disease (Honolulu Star-
Advertiser, 2 Feb 2016). 
Overall, with the repeated epidem-
ics and their often-fatal effects, the 
continuous laxity and ineffectiveness 
of mosquito eradication programs 
and other protective measures in the 
country is astonishing. Governmen-
tal authorities are not the only ones 
to blame. To this day, in contrast to 
several other Pacific Island countries, 
barely any house in Tahiti, even of 
wealthier people who could easily 
afford it, is equipped with screens in 
its doors and windows. 
In February 2016, attention turned 
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again to the uneasy relationship 
between Papeete and Paris, as French 
President François Hollande visited 
the country for several days, the first 
French head of state to do so since 
Jacques Chirac in 2003. Hollande 
has had a rather lukewarm relation-
ship with Papeete’s political class. The 
local pro-French leaders are allied 
with Hollande’s right-wing oppo-
nents, and he had betrayed the local 
allies of his French Socialist Party, the 
pro-independence Tavini Huiraatira 
party (which is the main component 
of upld) by opposing their ultimately 
successful bid for reinscription on the 
UN decolonization list despite hav-
ing previously promised in writing to 
support it. 
During his visit, however,  Hollande 
sent out two important positive sig-
nals. Very significant was his gesture 
to place a wreath on the tomb of 
Pouvanaa a Oopa (1895–1977), the 
country’s early nationalist leader who 
had been imprisoned on trumped-up 
charges by the French colonial admin-
istration in the 1950s and whose 
descendants have repeatedly asked for 
a formal rescinding of his unjust crimi-
nal conviction. Hollande’s act was all 
the more significant as he breached the 
normal order of protocol by honoring 
Pouvanaa first, before laying another 
wreath at the cenotaph in downtown 
Papeete to honor the local soldiers 
fallen in French wars (ti, 22 February 
2016).
Second, Hollande acted in stark 
contrast to his predecessors by being 
responsive to the demands made on 
him by representatives of Moruroa e 
Tatou and other nuclear-test-victim 
associations. Without reservation, he 
admitted to the heavy environmental, 
sanitary, social, and economic conse-
quences of the atomic weapons tests 
conducted in the territory from 1966 
to 1996, and he agreed that France 
owed the country redress for these 
consequences. In his speech, Hollande 
also admitted that the 2010 Morin 
Law providing for the compensation 
of nuclear-test victims had been virtu-
ally of no consequence, as only very 
few individuals have actually received 
compensation, and he announced that 
the law would be modified by decree 
within the current year in order to 
enable all victims of radiation-caused 
health problems to receive appropriate 
compensation. Furthermore, the presi-
dent announced the appropriation of 
financial and technical resources to 
continue the cleanup of irradiated or 
otherwise polluted former test sites 
and military support bases, as well 
as the creation of an information and 
documentation center on the tests 
in Tahiti and French government 
subsidies for the oncology section of 
the territorial hospital in Taaone in 
Pirae so that radiation-induced cancer 
patients can be treated locally (dt, 23 
Feb 2016).
Nonetheless, the president’s speech 
also contained inaccuracies about 
Tahiti’s history, since Hollande grossly 
exaggerated the historical depth of the 
islands’ political ties to France, claim-
ing that “in the eighteenth century 
the destiny of your people became 
united with that of France” (ti, 26 Feb 
2016). In fact, the first islands of what 
is today French Polynesia were not 
taken into possession by France until 
1842, and it was not until the turn 
of the twentieth century that all its 
islands came under French rule. 
The Moruroa e Tatou associa-
political reviews • polynesia 141
tion remained skeptical (ti, 22 Feb 
2015), since as of August 2016 the 
promised modification of the Morin 
Law has yet to be enacted. Nonethe-
less, Hollande’s plans found fertile 
soil in Fritch’s government. After 
more detailed discussion with Paris, 
Fritch announced in early June that 
the country’s government would 
make a formal agreement with Paris 
before the end of 2016 to redefine 
mutual relations, which he dubbed 
the “Papeete Accords” in the style of 
the 1998 “Nouméa Accords” of New 
Caledonia. A central point of these 
accords will be a formal recognition of 
the damages done by nuclear-weapons 
testing and of France’s obligations to 
provide redress, as Hollande outlined 
in his February speech. Furthermore, 
the accords are to contain pledges 
by Paris to provide for the improve-
ment of the country’s infrastructure 
and telecommunications systems, as 
well as for the support of Polynesian 
culture. The candidacy of the classical 
Polynesian temple complex of Marae 
Taputapuatea on Raiatea to be listed 
as a world heritage site with unesco 
is to be officially promoted by France. 
Generally, all areas in which the coun-
try lags behind France in socioeco-
nomic terms are to be gradually raised 
to French standards—a policy that 
resonates with Hollande’s program 
to eliminate inequalities between the 
“mother country” and the overseas 
territories (ti, 9 June 2016).
The planned accords are clearly 
part of Fritch’s grand strategy of 
 leaving a permanent mark on the 
political landscape and thereby 
raising his profile as a local states-
man, stepping out of the shadow of 
his predecessors Flosse and Temaru, 
respectively the “father figures” of 
the “autonomist” and “pro-indepen-
dence” political ideologies and now 
advocates of a further political evolu-
tion toward either free association 
(Flosse) or full sovereignty (Temaru). 
Where Fritch’s and Hollande’s inter-
ests coalesce is that both would like to 
create a “new deal” that looks good 
but does not call into question the 
current political framework of French 
Polynesia being an overseas political 
entity within the French Republic. 
Both hope that such a “deal” could be 
used in making a claim to the United 
Nations that the 2013 reinscription 
as a non-self-governing territory was 
unnecessary. 
As part of this master plan, Fritch 
has also been very active in regional 
politics, especially within the Polyne-
sian Leaders Group (plg), in which 
he is emerging as the second-most 
important leader after Sāmoa Prime 
Minister and plg founder Tuilaepa 
Sailele Malielegaoi. In July 2015, 
Fritch hosted a special plg meeting 
in Raiatea on Marae Taputapuatea 
itself, where the plg leaders solemnly 
signed the Taputapuatea Declaration 
on Climate Change—a significant 
contribution to raising Fritch’s profile 
in the region (rnzi, 16 July 2015). 
Later during the review period, Fritch 
traveled to Sāmoa to sign partnership 
agreements, mainly concerning tour-
ism development (Samoa Observer, 24 
April 2016), and made a demand to 
the Pacific Islands Forum demanding 
full membership for French Polyne-
sia, for which he apparently received 
support from New Zealand (pir, 3 
May, 26 May 2016). The signing of 
the Taputapuatea declaration was 
followed up by another plg meeting 
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in Papeete in late June 2016 (pir, 29 
June 2016).
Between Hollande’s new com-
mitment to provide redress for past 
wrongs and to set relations between 
Paris and Papeete on a new course, 
and Fritch’s increasingly proactive 
regional diplomacy, one could indeed 
get the impression that the country is 
on a positive postcolonial trajectory. 
However, a deeper analysis shows that 
this is not so, and any resemblance to 
the Nouméa Accords for New Cale-
donia is symbolic at the most. Unlike 
the latter, the planned Papeete Accords 
would not include any upgrade in the 
degree of self-government granted 
to the country government. Second, 
unlike in New Caledonia, there is no 
attempt to reach a consensus among 
the main political parties of French 
Polynesia, but instead there would 
merely be a convention between Paris 
and the majority of the day in the 
Papeete assembly. Finally, there is no 
timeline leading to a self-determina-
tion referendum on the political status 
of the territory. 
Unsurprisingly, institutions of the 
United Nations and UN-affiliated 
experts have been far from impressed 
by France’s efforts in dealing with the 
territory, or rather with the absence 
of such efforts. During its seventieth 
 session, the UN General Assembly 
once more noted France’s lack of 
cooperation with UN authorities 
regarding the territory, French Polyne-
sia being for the second time in a row 
the only one of the seventeen territo-
ries on the nsgt list about which the 
administrative power refused to trans-
mit information as obligated under 
article 73e of the UN charter (United 
Nations 2015b). This prompted the 
General Assembly to adopt another 
resolution reminding administrative 
powers to submit the information 
requested on their respective nsgts 
without delay (United Nations 2015a). 
Before the annual meeting of the UN 
Decolonization Committee on 24 
June, international decolonization 
expert Carlyle Corbin testified that 
French Polynesia’s so-called “auton-
omy does not meet international stan-
dards” (otr, 30 June 2016), echoing 
similarly critical testimonies presented 
to the committee by upld representa-
tives Richard Ariihau Tuheiava and 
Moetai Brotherson (otr, 27 June, 28 
June 2016). 
A month earlier, new French High 
Commissioner René Bidal assumed 
office, succeeding Lionel Beffre (ti, 30 
May 2016). While the replacement of 
the high commissioner every few years 
is routine, it is indeed remarkable 
that since 1977, when the title of the 
French government’s representative 
was changed from governor to high 
commissioner, almost all officeholders 
have been white metropolitan French-
men, the one exception being a white 
metropolitan woman in the early 
2000s. If indeed Hollande’s govern-
ment is insisting on full equality of the 
overseas territories within the French 
Republic, one might wonder why his 
government is not appointing a person 
of color from one of the other over-
seas territories to this position. 
Given all these pieces of evidence, 
decolonization indeed still has a 
long way to go in French Polynesia. 
Yet, like others in the Pacific, the 
country is in a process of transition 
in this regard, as there has been an 
increased interest in looking back on 
and appraising the colonial past, from 
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the nineteenth century to the second 
half of the twentieth—an assessment 
enlarged on in a recently published 
book by Tahiti-based French anthro-
pologist and political scientist Bruno 
Saura (2015; tpm, 11 Dec 2015).
Several important people joined the 
ancestors during the review period. In 
early December 2015, Jacques-Denis 
Drollet passed away at age ninety-two. 
Through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, 
Drollet was an important local politi-
cal figure in Pouvanaa’s Rassemble-
ment Démocratique des Populations 
Tahitiennes party, although he later 
joined other local politicians in oppor-
tunistic switches of allegiance. He also 
became known to the tabloid press as 
the father of Hollywood actor Marlon 
Brando’s son-in-law, who was mur-
dered by one of Brando’s sons in the 
1990s (tpm, 11 Dec 2015). Another 
important twentieth-century Tahitian 
politician from Pouvanaa’s entourage, 
Daniel Millaud, died on 21 June at age 
eighty-seven. Millaud had succeeded 
Pouvanaa as French Polynesia’s sena-
tor in Paris and held the Senate seat 
from 1977 until succeeded by Gaston 
Flosse in 1998 (ti, 23 June 2016).
Among the deceased was also an 
important descendant of Tahitian 
royalty and, to return to the theme of 
this year’s reviews, a powerful female 
community leader. On 31 December 
2015, Geneviève Moeterauri Tetupaia 
i Hauviri Salmon-Pomare departed 
this world at the age of ninety-one. 
The princess was the great-great-great-
granddaughter of Queen Pomare IV 
and the adopted granddaughter of 
Queen Marau, King Pomare V’s con-
sort. With many local political leaders 
descendants of the old arii (chiefly) 
class, the funeral was prominently 
attended by both Oscar Temaru and 
Senator Lana Tetuanui of the pro-
Fritch camp (ti, 5 Jan 2016).
lorenz gonschor
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Māori Issues 
Over the past year we lost a num-
ber of leaders who spent their lives 
fighting for justice for Māori. In 
September 2015, Lady Emily Latimer 
of Whakatōhea passed away. She 
was a staunch supporter of Māori in 
her work with the Māori Women’s 
Welfare League and Māori Wardens 
and was a tireless supporter of her 
husband, Sir Graham Latimer, who 
died nine months after his wife in June 
2016; he had chaired the New Zea-
land Māori Council for many years. 
September 2015 was a particularly sad 
month. Two of our best-known clay 
artists, Manos Nathan and Colleen 
Waata Urlich, passed away within a 
fortnight of each other. Of Te Rōroa, 
Ngāpuhi, and Ngāti Whātua, Manos 
had an extensive background in 
woodcarving and sculpture,  having 
carved the meeting house of his 
Matatina Marae in Waipoua Forest 
(Tamati-Quennell 2015). Colleen, of 
Te Popoto o Ngāpuhi ki Kaipara and 
Te Rarawa, was world renowned for 
her clay work, which has been exhib-
ited throughout New Zealand and in 
the United States, the United King-
dom, Australia, and Canada (Tamati-
Quennell 2015; Creative New Zealand 
2015). Te Rarawa lost a greatly loved 
leader, Gloria Herbert. She was the 
chair of their iwi authority, served on 
the Waitangi Tribunal, and was well 
known as being caring and gentle but 
also very determined. Ngāreta Mete 
Jones of Te Rarawa was a lifelong 
worker for change for Māori. She was 
one of the founders of Kawariki, the 
movement that brought out a new 
generation of northern youth in the 
1980s to protest the Crown’s failure 
to honor Te Tiriti o Waitangi, the 
Māori-language treaty between Māori 
and the queen of England (Waatea 
News 2015b). Waereti Pōpata (Wal-
ters) of Te Paatu, Ngāti Kahu, was a 
fearless Māori rights advocate and one 
of the first Māori community health 
workers. 
In November 2015, we lost Dr 
Bruce Gregory of Ngāti Te Ao, Te 
Rarawa. He was the member of Par-
liament (mp) for Northern Māori from 
1980 until 1993. He dedicated his life 
to Māori health and the sovereignty of 
his hapū (group of extended families) 
(Collins 2015b). In January 2016, 
it was Andy Sarich of Ngāpuhi. He 
was dedicated to the retention of the 
Māori language in Te Taitokerau (the 
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North) and served on a wide range of 
community committees, councils, and 
the Lotteries Commission (Waatea 
News 2016a). In February, it was 
Emeritus Professor Ranginui Walker 
of Te Whakatōhea. He fought for 
almost five decades to lift the burden 
of colonialism and marginalization off 
Māori. He was one of Maoridom’s 
most influential academic leaders 
and advocates for Māori rights and 
social justice. He used his columns in 
the weekly Listener magazine and his 
six books to educate New Zealand-
ers about the history of this country 
and the abrogation of the human and 
treaty rights of Māori that continues 
to this day (Mutu 2016a). 
Whai Ngata of Ngāti Porou left us 
in April 2016. He was the journalist 
and broadcaster who established the 
Māori news program Te Karere on 
tvnz, leading a small group in the 
successful battle to maintain a Māori 
presence on national television. He 
was also a lexicographer who helped 
complete his father’s English-Māori 
dictionary (Harawira 2016). In May, it 
was Mānuera Tohu of Ngāti Kahu and 
Te Rarawa, another lifelong advo-
cate for the retention of the Māori 
language. He served on the Kōhanga 
Reo (Māori language immersion 
preschools) National Trust for many 
years and was a greatly esteemed 
orator and expert in tikanga (Māori 
law) and whakapapa (genealogy) and 
a kaumātua (respected elder) for the 
New Zealand Police. In June, it was 
Rob Cooper of Ngāti Hine. He made 
huge contributions to Māori health 
and education, with a long record 
on treaty education and social justice 
issues. Thousands of mourners trav-
eled to pay their respects to each of 
these great leaders, celebrating their 
lives and achievements, and bidding 
them farewell as they joined their 
ancestors.
Among the women leaders who 
passed away, Gloria Herbert was a 
rare example of a chairperson of her 
iwi’s representative body. Although 
women continue to play significant 
leadership roles in whānau (extended 
family), hapū, and iwi (groupings of 
hapū), English colonizers denied the 
role of women as leaders (Mikaere 
2010) and trained and promoted 
men for roles of political leadership. 
Nowhere is that reflected more clearly 
than in the influential National Iwi 
Chairs Forum (Mutu 2016b, 230). 
Of the now 72 chairpersons of iwi 
who make up the forum, only 8 are 
women (National Iwi Chairs Forum 
2016; Forum Secretariat, pers comm, 
4 Aug 2016). There is a much better 
balance in Parliament, where 11 of the 
26 mps of Māori descent are women: 
3 in the governing National Party, 3 in 
Labour, 2 each in the Greens and New 
Zealand First, and 1 in the Māori 
Party. Metiria Tūrei is a co-leader of 
the Greens; Mārama Fox a co-leader 
of the Māori Party (which currently 
has two seats in Parliament); while 
Paula Bennett and Hekia Parata are 
ministers in the National government. 
However, none of these mps represent 
Māori, and for the two Māori women 
mps who do—Nanaia Mahuta and 
Meka Whaitiri—their first loyalty is to 
their Labour Party rather than to their 
constituents.
In order to reclaim our mana motu-
hake (autonomy, power, authority, 
and control derived from the gods), 
which includes our sovereignty, and 
to put an end to the treaty and human 
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rights violations Māori continue to 
suffer, constitutional transformation 
is a necessity. Since 2010, a group 
of constitutional specialists, Matike 
Mai Aotearoa, have been drawing 
up models for a constitution for the 
country based on tikanga and the two 
founding documents of present-day 
New Zealand, He Whakaputanga o Te 
Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni (the 1835 
declaration of Māori sovereignty and 
independence) and Te Tiriti o Waitangi 
(Mutu 2015, 276). After extensive 
consultation with Māori throughout 
the country, Matike Mai Aotearoa 
published its report in February 2016 
(Jackson and Mutu 2016). It sets out 
the very strong case for constitutional 
transformation that moves the coun-
try from a governance system that is 
defined by, controlled by, and serves 
the white majority to one that is inclu-
sive of and respects all New Zealand-
ers and recognizes that Māori can and 
will take back control of their lives 
and resources. It sets out six indicative 
constitutional models that have arisen 
from the discussions. Each provides 
for the “rangatiratanga sphere,” that 
is, the sphere of influence of Māori; 
the “kāwanatanga sphere,” the sphere 
of influence of the British Crown; 
and the “relational sphere,” in which 
Māori and the Crown work together 
as equals as agreed in Te Tiriti o Wai-
tangi (Jackson and Mutu 2016, 9). 
There has been increasing acknowl-
edgment of the need to transform New 
Zealand’s constitutional arrangements, 
especially among the country’s large 
Pacific Island, Chinese, and Indian 
communities, who continue to experi-
ence discrimination (United Nations 
General Assembly 2014). From within 
the Pākehā (European) community, 
Chief Justice Dame Sian Elias com-
mented, “It is possible we will see 
increasing pluralism in New Zealand’s 
domestic legal order in fulfillment of 
Treaty guarantees” (Elias 2015). Past 
Prime Minister Sir Geoffrey Palmer is 
now advocating for a written constitu-
tion, which has to recognize the Treaty 
of Waitangi because “it actually makes 
government here legitimate” (Moore 
2016). A columnist in the Far North’s 
Northland Age quoted extracts from 
the Matike Mai Aotearoa report in her 
column for several months (Herbert-
Graves 2016), which drew a number 
of vitriolic and racist responses from 
one letter writer and letters of support 
from others.
Māori nevertheless continued 
to battle the government on many 
fronts. Perhaps the most sobering 
battle was that against homeless-
ness. Soaring housing costs fueled by 
speculators and developers as well as 
the government’s refusal to intervene 
have resulted in alarming numbers of 
families sleeping in cars because they 
cannot pay for housing. Many of the 
adults sleeping rough are employed, 
and most are Māori. Despite attempts 
to highlight the plight of these people 
(Harris 2015), government inaction 
has led to some Māori communi-
ties making their marae (traditional 
communal meeting places) avail-
able to families. Te Puea Marae in 
South Auckland was inundated with 
responses to its call on the public to 
donate food, clothing, bedding, and 
money (Clarke 2016a). But their 
persistence in helping and then find-
ing housing for the homeless did not 
reflect well on the government. Staff in 
the minister of social housing’s office 
retaliated by attacking the chairman 
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of the marae, a senior police inspec-
tor (tvnz 2016). The minister subse-
quently apologized.
Māori were joined by large num-
bers of people in opposing the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (tpp) Agreement. 
Despite the government’s maintaining 
a tight veil of secrecy around negotia-
tions between the twelve countries 
involved, information provided by 
Professor Jane Kelsey and a team 
of legal scholars indicated that the 
tpp agreement allowed international 
companies to override Māori rights 
and to sue the government if it inter-
vened in a manner that lowered their 
planned profits. Key issues were the 
government’s ceding the country’s 
sovereignty to international companies 
and the threats those companies posed 
to natural resources, especially with 
respect to flora, fauna, minerals, and 
water; to the affordability of medi-
cines; and to the country’s Smokefree 
2025 Strategy (Kelsey 2015). A com-
plaint to the Waitangi Tribunal and 
huge protests throughout the country 
all fell on deaf ears. The government 
signed the tpp agreement on 4 Febru-
ary 2016.
The progress of Tiriti o Waitangi 
claims against the Crown continued 
to be plagued with problems. While 
the government flooded media outlets 
with press releases about progress 
being made in settling treaty claims, 
the reality in the courts and the 
Waitangi Tribunal, and for claim-
ants, was very different. Ngāti Kahu 
of the Far North was successful in its 
application to the high court to quash 
the Waitangi Tribunal decision not to 
give them binding recommendations 
over the state-owned enterprises and 
Crown forestlands in their territory. 
The tribunal was ordered to rehear 
the application (Vertongen 2015; Feint 
2015). The Crown has appealed that 
decision as well as the same decision 
with respect to the Mangatū Incorpo-
ration (see Mutu 2016b, 232) to the 
Court of Appeal, whose rulings are 
still awaited. 
The Waitangi Tribunal received 
a number of applications for urgent 
hearings into the government’s recog-
nizing mandates to negotiate settle-
ments. The government requirement 
that it deal only with “large natural 
groupings” is inconsistently applied 
and usually disenfranchises many 
claimant groups. It inevitably causes 
huge and bitter divisions within and 
among claimant communities as they 
fight over who is going to represent 
them. Claimants are painfully aware 
that they are fighting over mere 
crumbs that the government provides 
in exchange for extinguishing their 
claims and legal rights, but they are 
crumbs that impoverished communi-
ties desperately need. Despite that, the 
tribunal turns down almost all of these 
applications. It did, however, agree to 
urgent hearings for the Hauraki Col-
lective with respect to the Tauranga 
Moana Governance Group (Coyle 
2015) and for Ngātiwai with respect 
to the Ngātiwai Trust Board Deed of 
Mandate (UnRuh 2016). Those hear-
ings have yet to take place.
The tribunal reported on its inquiry 
into the mandate for the largest 
iwi, Ngāpuhi (Mutu 2016b, 231), 
upholding claims that the Crown 
had breached the principles of the 
treaty by choosing to recognize the 
mandate of the negotiating group, 
Tūhoronuku. It concluded that the 
hapū should decide how and by whom 
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they are to be represented in settle-
ment negotiations. It recommended 
that the Crown delay negotiations 
to give the hapū the opportunity to 
confirm whether they wished to be 
represented by Tūhoronuku (Jones 
2015). Controversy and bitter infight-
ing continued to beleaguer the iwi. 
When the chairperson of Tūhoronuku 
was arrested and charged and then 
eventually pleaded guilty to shooting 
and possessing a protected bird species 
and attempting to pervert the course 
of justice (Northern Advocate 2016), 
the group replaced him. They then set 
about working with the hapū to try to 
resolve their issues. 
The government has worked hard 
to prevent the public from knowing 
how much claimants loathe the forced 
treaty claims settlements that are 
unilaterally designed and applied by 
the Crown (Sykes 2015, 34). However, 
one example of claimants who are pre-
pared to stand their ground against the 
government and attract public atten-
tion is Ngāti Kahu of the Far North. 
Like others, they have refused to 
accept government offers to extinguish 
their claims. Instead of the political 
pathway of direct negotiations pre-
ferred by the government, they have 
chosen the legal route and are await-
ing hearings for binding recommenda-
tions from the Waitangi Tribunal. In 
September 2015, several hapū of Ngāti 
Kahu repossessed the Kaitāia airport 
after the government decided to sell 
it to a neighboring iwi. The land had 
been taken under the Public Works 
Act during World War II. That legisla-
tion requires governments to offer the 
land back to those from whom it was 
taken, that is, the Ngāti Kahu hapū. 
New Zealand First’s veteran politician, 
Winston Peters, went into battle in 
Parliament for Ngāti Kahu and forced 
an admission from Minister of Treaty 
of Waitangi Negotiations Christopher 
Finlayson that the land does belong 
to Ngāti Kahu (Mason 2015). The 
minister retaliated by attacking Ngāti 
Kahu’s leadership. Elders and marae 
representatives responded by issuing a 
stinging attack on the minister (Collins 
2015a). While that brought a measure 
of respite for Ngāti Kahu for several 
months as they awaited hearings with 
respect to their claims in the Court 
of Appeal and the Waitangi Tribunal, 
by June 2016 the minister was at it 
again, indicating that he would ignore 
the mandate Ngāti Kahu gave to its 
rūnanga (council of representatives, 
parliament) and find someone else to 
negotiate with (Finlayson and Flavell 
2016).
In Taranaki, bitter divisions over 
the Pekapeka block being excluded 
from Te Ātiawa’s settlement contin-
ued (Martin 2016; Pihama 2016). 
In Hawke’s Bay, Ngāti Hinemanu 
and Ngāti Paki continued to protest 
against the government’s rushing 
through the Heretaunga Tamatea 
settlement in order to prevent their 
seeking binding recommendations in 
the Waitangi Tribunal for their lands 
in the Kāweka and Gwavas forests 
(Waatea News 2015a). Objections to 
an ex-employee of the Office of Treaty 
Settlements heading the negotiations 
for Heretaunga Tamatea were ignored 
(Moana Jackson, pers comm, April 
2015), although the Crown regularly 
ignores conflicts of interest to impose 
its own employees on claimants as 
their negotiators (Mutu 2016b, 229). 
Rangitāne of Wairarapa were still 
battling to stop their claims from 
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being subsumed and extinguished 
under another iwi’s settlement (Crom-
bie 2015). Āraukūkū hapū went 
to the high court after their claims 
were included for extinguishment 
in Ngāruahine’s deed of settlement 
without the knowledge or permission 
of either Āraukūkū or Ngāruahine. 
Āraukūkū had not been included in 
any negotiations, and Ngāruahine 
had not negotiated on their behalf. A 
Ngāruahine negotiator reported that 
the minister could not say why he had 
arbitrarily included the claim, but he 
also refused to remove it (McLach-
lan 2015).
Meanwhile, those who have settled 
continue to run into problems with 
the government violating their settle-
ments. Ngāti Whātua o Ōrākei filed 
in the high court to stop the govern-
ment from selling lands for which 
they hold rights of first refusal as a 
result of their treaty claims settle-
ment (Brown 2015). Waikato-Tainui 
did likewise to stop the sale of lands 
used by Solid Energy (a state-owned 
enterprise) at Huntly. They have rights 
of first refusal over those lands as 
a result of their settlement (Clarke 
2016b). Taranaki ki Te Upoko o Te 
Ika found itself embattled with Port 
Nicholson Block Settlement Trust 
when the trust tried to sell lands the 
iwi had recovered through their settle-
ment. After much turmoil, the people’s 
wishes were adhered to (McLachlan 
2016). However, the greatest outrage 
was expressed over the government’s 
starting to unravel the 1992 fisheries 
settlement by banning fishing in its 
proposed Kermadec Ocean Sanctuary. 
The settlement guaranteed Māori the 
right to fish the area, but establishing 
the sanctuary removed those rights 
without consultation or compensation 
(McBeth 2016). Te Ohu Kaimoana, 
the  iwi-controlled company that 
 manages Māori commercial fisheries, 
took the government to the high court 
when it refused to negotiate a resolu-
tion. The government then applied 
to the court to adjourn the case until 
the proposal had been passed into 
law (Stuff 2016). While iwi are very 
angry that the meager settlements they 
fought so hard for can so easily be 
unraveled by unscrupulous politicians, 
it sends a clear signal that if the gov-
ernment can violate settlements with 
impunity then they are not durable 
and can all be revisited.
Despite the anger directed at them 
over treaty claims settlements, the 
government still managed to enact 
legislation extinguishing the claims of 
Te Aupōuri, Te Rarawa, Ngāi Takoto, 
and Ngāti Kurī in the Far North and 
Ngāti Hineuru in the central North 
Island. The government claims to 
have enacted legislation for 69 settle-
ments and that 49 still remain (Office 
of Treaty Settlements 2016). In fact 
there are many more than that, but the 
government simply refuses to recog-
nize them.
Another time-consuming battle has 
been that against the rewriting of Te 
Ture Whenua Māori (the Māori Land 
Act) of 1993. It took twenty years to 
pass that into legislation. It returned 
control of Māori land to its own-
ers and made the sale of Māori land 
difficult. Greedy speculators and land 
grabbers could no longer target it. 
The rewriting was initiated in 2012 by 
Attorney General Christopher Finlay-
son (who is also the minister of Treaty 
of Waitangi negotiations and associate 
minister of Māori Affairs). While aim-
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ing to free up Māori land for utiliza-
tion, the bill also facilitates its sale, 
which Māori have fought so hard to 
stop. When Māori opposition to the 
rewriting became too intense, in 2014 
the attorney general passed it over to 
Te Ururoa Flavell, the new minister of 
Māori development, with instructions 
that he have it passed into legisla-
tion. The National Iwi Chairs Forum 
consulted very widely on the bill, 
receiving instructions from throughout 
the country that if the 1993 act was 
to be rewritten, only Māori could do 
so because the land is theirs (National 
Iwi Chairs Forum 2014). Māori Land 
Court judges prepared a lengthy sub-
mission on the bill, severely criticizing 
it (Love 2015). The Waitangi Tribunal 
also severely criticized it, upholding 
the claims of landowners opposed to 
the bill (Love 2016a). The bill was 
introduced into the House in May. It 
ignores the Māori Land Court judges’ 
advice, the Waitangi Tribunal’s recom-
mendations, and the overwhelming 
opposition of Māori landowners. It 
focuses on developing Māori land 
rather than retaining it in Māori 
control and portrays loss of Māori 
ownership as the fault of the Māori 
owners (Love 2016b). The bill has 
been characterized as yet another land 
confiscation, and the matter has been 
referred to the United Nations (Proc-
tor 2016; Walsh 2016). 
Battles to protect Māori natural 
resources persisted around the country 
throughout the year, although in some 
areas there was welcome relief. Both 
the New Zealand Māori Council and 
National Iwi Chairs Forum contin-
ued to fight to have the government 
recognize and acknowledge Māori 
ownership of water. The govern-
ment has been refusing to discuss 
the matter despite having promised 
the Supreme Court in 2012 that it 
would do so (Mutu 2014, 211). The 
battle to force the owners to remove 
the ship Rena—which was wrecked 
on Ōtaiti (Astrolabe Reef) off the 
Motiti Island in the Bay of Plenty in 
2011 (Mutu 2013, 168)—became 
more difficult with the Bay of Plenty 
Regional Council decision to leave the 
wreck on the reef. Ngāi Te Hapū of 
Motiti Island is appealing the decision 
(Waatea News 2016b). After fighting 
a designation placed on hapū land in 
1963 to take it for the Rotorua East-
ern Arterial road (Mutu 2014, 211), 
the hapū of Te Arawa were thrilled 
when the designation was finally lifted 
in April. And four Ngāi Tahu tribal 
entities welcomed the decision stop-
ping Christchurch City Council from 
discharging treated wastewater into 
Akaroa Harbour. They opposed the 
council’s appeal against the decision 
to the Environment Court, which 
resulted in the council’s discussing and 
then proposing a series of options, 
almost all of which Ngāi Tahu sup-
ported (Law 2016).
Also on the good-news front, Māori 
filmmaker Taika Waititi has won no 
fewer than eight international film 
festival awards for his comedy Hunt 
for the Wilderpeople (IMDb 2016). 
And Lisa Carrington (Te Aitanga 
a Māhaki, Ngāti Porou), paddler 
extraordinaire, won the World Paddle 
Awards Sportswoman of the Year 
at the Annual World Paddle awards 
held in Barcelona, Spain. She has won 
her sixth World Cup gold medal in 
as many races in the k1 200 meter 
 (Baalbergen 2016).
margaret mutu
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Norfolk Island
The year under review was a fateful 
one for Norfolk Island, and indeed 
for the entire Pacific Islands region, 
as it marked the unprecedented 
 recolonization of an island territory 
by its administrative power without 
the  territory’s consent, an anachro-
nistic act going against the current of 
decolonization of the past six decades 
and comparable in modern history 
only to the reactionary French policies 
toward its Pacific possessions from the 
late 1950s to the mid-1980s. Austra-
lia’s recolonizing policies sparked an 
outburst of Norfolk Island national-
ism and a well-organized resistance 
movement struggling both locally 
and globally for the restoration of 
 democracy to the island community.
A British colony settled in 1856 
from Pitcairn Island by the descen-
dants of the Bounty mutineers and 
their Tahitian partners (some of whom 
later returned to Pitcairn to become 
the ancestors of that island’s current 
inhabitants), Norfolk Island became 
a dependent territory of Australia in 
1914, and six decades later Australia 
initiated steps toward the island’s 
decolonization by granting it a large 
degree of self-government in 1979, 
an arrangement similar to other 
autonomous dependent territories 
in the region.
However, the 2008–2009 global 
financial crisis hit the island’s mainly 
tourism-based economy particu-
larly hard (after earlier disruptions 
 including miscalculated investments 
in a locally owned airline in 2006), 
and from 2010 onward, the local 
government’s budget operated at 
a deficit. This necessitated annual 
subsidies from the Australian fed-
eral government ranging from a$3.2 
 million in 2011 (us$2.4 million) up 
to a$7.5 million (us$5.6 million) in 
the 2014–2015 financial year. Under 
the 1979 statutes, Norfolk Island 
was not allowed to borrow money 
in order to cover deficits without 
Canberra’s  permission, which was 
not  forthcoming. In 2010, Australia 
first refused to provide the requested 
 budgetary subsidy but then agreed to 
it on condition that Norfolk Island 
paid Australian federal taxes and 
accepted financial oversight by federal 
officials, which the local government 
agreed to under protest (C Nobbs 
2016b). 
The 2007–2013 Australian Labor 
Party government under Prime Minis-
ters Julia Gillard and Kevin Rudd had 
agreed to further negotiations with 
the Norfolk Island territorial gov-
ernment over the issue, and the two 
governments had signed a “Norfolk 
Island Road Map” for that purpose 
in 2011. But the Liberal Party govern-
ment under Tony Abbott that came 
to power in Australia in 2013 repu-
diated this compromise and instead 
advocated a hard-line, reactionary 
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approach. A report commissioned by 
the federal government in 2014—orig-
inally intended to look into economic 
issues, not political institutions—rec-
ommended shutting down the Nor-
folk Island government altogether 
and replacing it with direct rule by 
Canberra, and the Abbot govern-
ment followed the report, introducing 
corresponding legislation in Austra-
lia’s Parliament. The Norfolk Island 
Legislation Amendment Act 2015 was 
first tabled in the Australian House of 
Representatives on 26 March and in 
the Senate on 13 May. 
The Norfolk Island government 
reacted immediately to the impending 
threat to its existence. On 27 March 
2015, while the bill was moving 
through the federal parliament, the 
island’s Legislative Assembly called 
for a referendum to be held on 8 May 
among the local voters on the ques-
tion of whether the people of Norfolk 
Island should have the right of self-
determination and should be consulted 
before any changes to their political 
institutions were made by the Austra-
lian Parliament (Norfolk Island Gov-
ernment Gazette, 27 March 2015). 
The result could not have been clearer, 
with an overwhelming majority of 624 
out of 912 participants (68% out of 
a 92% turnout of registered voters) 
 voting “Yes” to the question (rnz, 
9 May 2015).
However, the Australian Parlia-
ment ignored the referendum, and 
with strong bipartisan support from 
the ranks of both the Liberal govern-
ment and the Labor opposition, the 
bill passed both houses on 14 May 
and was assented to by Australia’s 
governor-general, Peter Cosgrove, on 
26 May 2015. In the debate leading 
to the bill’s passage, no parliamen-
tarian acknowledged this obvious 
denial of democracy, and some even 
mocked the more than two-thirds 
majority vote in the referendum as 
merely representing “some” people 
on the island being “unhappy” or 
having “concerns” (Government of 
Australia 2015b). Further protests and 
complaints by Norfolk Island Legisla-
tive Assembly Speaker David Buffett 
and Chief Minister Lisle Snell used all 
available avenues, such as an article 
in the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association’s magazine (Buffett and 
Snell 2015) and a letter to Queen 
Elizabeth II (A Nobbs 2016, 26), but 
to no avail.
As a consequence of the Nor-
folk Island Legislation Amendment 
Act, the Norfolk Island Legislative 
Assembly as well as the executive 
branch were dissolved on 17 June 
2015 and the administration of the 
island was placed under the authority 
of Canberra-appointed administra-
tor Gary Hardgrave. All assets and 
public accounts held by the Norfolk 
Island government were seized by the 
Australian federal government. Shortly 
thereafter, Federal Minister Jamie 
Briggs designated a handpicked five-
member “advisory council,” ostensibly 
to allow some kind of  community 
consultation process, but for the next 
twelve months the island was ruled 
by a regime with no accountabil-
ity to the population. Perhaps most 
important on a symbolical level, the 
Norfolk Island Legislation Amend-
ment Act 2015 deleted the preamble 
of the Norfolk Island Act 1979, which 
recognized the Pitcairn descendants 
as a culturally distinct people and 
acknowledged their special relation-
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ship to the island (Government of 
Australia 2015a, 2001).
As is common in cases where 
democracy is abolished and replaced 
with an authoritarian regime, what 
followed were very worrisome prac-
tices of limiting freedom of speech 
and of arbitrary, extrajudicial punish-
ment of political opponents. The local 
radio station was placed under heavy 
censorship, the broadcast of opinions 
 critical of the Australian govern-
ment was prohibited, and dissenting 
journalists, including the hosts of a 
popular satirical show, were fired 
(Newshub, 4 July 2016). In the same 
vein, a local government employee 
who criticized Hardgrave using insult-
ing language in a private Facebook 
post had her salary reduced and was 
told that she would be laid off as soon 
as the new administrative system was 
implemented (smh, 25 May 2015).
Another common policy for 
postcoup authoritarian regimes is to 
rewrite history and seek to erase the 
memory of the previous democratic 
system of government. Hardgrave’s 
neocolonial administration followed 
this model well, and in October 
2015 it permitted the removal of the 
furniture and all other items from the 
legislative chamber, which became a 
completely empty room, annihilating 
all physical evidence that a legislature 
of Norfolk Island had ever existed. 
The legislative chamber was located 
in the Old Military Barracks, one of 
the historic buildings dating from the 
early nineteenth century British penal 
settlement that is part of the Kings-
ton and Arthur’s Vale Historic Area 
(kavha) and has been inscribed on 
the unesco World Heritage list since 
2010. By unilaterally removing the 
legislative furnishings without con-
sulting unesco and the local board 
that administered kavha at that time, 
Australia violated its international 
obligations (C Nobbs 2016a).
All of these arbitrary and antidemo-
cratic measures led to strong reactions 
and resistance on the part of the island 
community. As soon as the Australian 
government announced its intent to 
unilaterally change Norfolk Island’s 
system of government in October 
2014—long before the actual bill 
was introduced in the federal parlia-
ment—two petitions were presented 
to the Australian Senate and House of 
Representatives, containing 830 and 
834 signatures, respectively, asking for 
the island community to be consulted 
by means of a referendum before any 
legislative process would start in that 
matter (A Nobbs 2016, 6). 
On 18 May 2015, immediately 
after Canberra had ignored the 
island’s 8 May referendum and passed 
the unwanted legislation, a represen-
tative group of local political leaders 
founded the Norfolk Island People 
for Democracy (nipd) association as 
a local, national, and international 
pressure group for the maintenance 
of the island’s self-government. The 
founding board members included 
the then Chief Minister Lisle Snell; 
four of his predecessors, including 
current Assembly Speaker and long-
serving Chief Minister David Buffett, 
who had repeatedly held either office 
since 1979 and might be considered 
Norfolk Island’s “elder statesman”; 
several other current or former cabinet 
ministers and legislators; and Albert 
Buffett, president of the Norfolk 
Island Council of Elders (nipd 2015). 
By July 2016, more than half the 
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population of Norfolk Island had 
become nipd members (Newshub, 
4 July 2016).
Later in 2015, the island saw a 
rare protest march through its streets, 
with several hundred participants—
an enormous turnout for the small 
community of about 1,700 (rnz, 29 
Sept 2015). In parallel, Hands Up 
For Democracy, another organiza-
tion loosely associated with nipd, 
created a protest installation right in 
the middle of Burnt Pine (the island’s 
commercial center), next to the main 
shopping mall, where it put up hun-
dreds of wooden signs each showing a 
green hand—symbolizing democratic 
choice—and on which a supporter’s 
name was inscribed. 
The fact that opposition to Aus-
tralia’s recolonization scheme was a 
mass movement representing the vast 
majority of the local people, and not a 
marginal group of political radicals as 
constantly claimed by Administrator 
Hardgrave and Canberra politicians, 
was impossible to miss. Besides the 
Hands Up installation and the nipd 
headquarters opening in a refurbished 
building in the center of the shopping 
precinct, Norfolk Island’s iconic flag 
with the pine tree in green and white 
went up everywhere—in people’s 
yards, on their fences, on car dash-
boards and radio antennas, and so 
on—as did wooden green hands. The 
only places that still flew the Austra-
lian flag next to that of Norfolk were 
official buildings; the rest of the island 
became an ocean of solid green and 
white, an outburst of Norfolk patrio-
tism rarely seen so graphically in the 
island’s previous history.
Administrator Hardgrave’s attitude 
in the face of criticism soon made 
him the most resented person on the 
island. For the annual Bounty Day 
celebration on 8 June, during which 
the landing of the Pitcairners in 1856 
is reenacted, Hardgrave was disinvited 
to participate and play the traditional 
role of the British commissioner 
welcoming the Pitcairners, which was 
customary for Australian administra-
tors. In addition, several shops on the 
island put up signs declaring them-
selves “Hardgrave-free zones” (New 
Zealand Herald, 27 July 2015).
In November 2015, former Chief 
Minister Andre Nobbs (in office 
2007–2010) traveled to London and 
gave a speech before British members 
of Parliament at Westminster asking 
for their support (A Nobbs 2016, 1, 
28, 31–32). Several UK parliamentar-
ians have since become committed 
supporters of Norfolk Island and 
conducted a mission of inquiry on 
the island in September 2016. This is 
quite significant, as Norfolk’s origi-
nal colonial relationship was directly 
with Great Britain, while the island’s 
administration was handed over to 
Australia against the Islanders’ wishes. 
In the three months preceding the 
final takeover on 1 July 2016, protest 
moves intensified. On 22 April, nipd 
through its president Chris Magri; 
the dissolved Legislative Assembly 
through its Speaker David Buffett; 
and the Council of Elders through 
its President Albert Buffett sent a 
petition to the UN Special Com-
mittee on Decolonization, arguing 
for Norfolk Island to be listed as a 
non-self-governing territory (nsgt). 
The petition provided comprehensive 
documentation as to why the island 
qualifies under the rules outlined in 
UN General Assembly resolution 1541 
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of the 1960s that defines a nsgt as a 
territory geographically separate and 
culturally and/or ethnically distinct 
from its adminis trative power (Nor-
folk Island 2016). The petition was 
delivered by well-known human rights 
attorney Geoffrey Robertson qc, and 
a few weeks later it was augmented by 
a joint opinion by two eminent British 
and Australian lawyers (Lowe and 
Ward 2016). 
While awaiting UN action, for-
mer Chief Minister Snell further-
more called for a royal commission 
to inquire into the antidemocratic 
actions of the Australian government 
(The Guardian, 26 April 2016). The 
next day, a mass gathering of about 
350 people took place in the yard 
of the Old Military Barracks, out of 
which the Legislative Assembly and 
all its furnishings had been forcefully 
removed, and which is sited opposite 
Government House, the residence 
of Administrator Hardgrave. The 
meeting resulted in an open letter to 
Hardgrave calling for his immediate 
resignation. In addition it galvanized 
the establishment of a “tent embassy” 
to permanently occupy the compound, 
with protestors setting up tents, ban-
ners, and upside-down Norfolk Island 
flags as a symbol of distress in this 
strategic location, well positioned to 
attract the attention of tourists visiting 
the historical buildings in the area (A 
Nobbs 2016, 22). Loosely modeled 
on the iconic tent embassy of Austra-
lian Aboriginal activists in Canberra, 
at the time of writing this review the 
protest camp is still being maintained 
by a core group of activists who have 
vowed to remain until a Legisla-
tive Assembly is reconvened in the 
 building. 
Despite all of this, Australia’s neo-
colonial machinery kept moving for-
ward. Adding insult to injury, under 
the new system Norfolk Island was 
to become subject to the laws of the 
Australian state of New South Wales 
(NSW) yet would have no representa-
tion in the NSW legislature. In May 
2016, the NSW Parliament passed the 
Norfolk Island Administration Bill 
2016, which was assented to by the 
NSW governor on 7 June 2016 (Gov-
ernment of New South Wales 2016). 
Due to intense lobbying by nipd, the 
NSW opposition Labor and Green 
parties opposed the bill and their 
representatives helped expose its anti-
democratic nature, but these efforts 
were fruitless, as it passed with the 
votes of the Liberal-led majority (The 
Guardian, 2 June 2016). While Labor 
remained anti-Norfolk at the federal 
level, at least the Islanders had won 
the coherent support of the Australian 
Greens, which made a public state-
ment criticizing the Norfolk recoloni-
zation scheme (Rhiannon 2016). 
On 1 July 2016, referred to by 
locals as “invasion day,” the new 
system became effective as planned. 
In one of the few non-English news 
articles on the situation, Norwegian 
journalist Dag Øistein Endsjø sum-
marized it most dramatically: “Tomor-
row a country ceases to exist, but the 
world doesn’t care” (Endsjø 2016). As 
a non-self-governing external territory 
of Australia, the island was now ruled 
directly by the federal government in 
Canberra, which is responsible for all 
federal and state level services. While 
the latter are provided according to 
NSW laws, the island is not part of 
NSW and thus has no voice in the 
making of those laws. 
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On the federal level, however, 
Norfolk Island now purportedly had 
representation, as it was included in 
the electorate of Canberra in the Aus-
tralian Capital Territory. Of course, 
in an electorate of several hundred 
thousand, the few hundred votes from 
Norfolk practically do not matter at 
all. But since Australia has a policy 
requiring all eligible citizens to vote in 
elections, the law will have the effect 
of forcing Norfolk Islanders, against 
their consent, to vote in elections 
where their votes have no effect (Aus-
tralian Electoral Commission 2016). 
One of the most obvious negative 
consequences of the new system was 
the abolishment of Norfolk Island 
stamps. The Norfolk Island post 
office was closed down, its services 
now performed by Australia Post, 
which accepts only Australian stamps. 
This change deprived the island of an 
important local industry, the selling of 
stamps to collectors—an important 
source of revenue for very small ter-
ritories, once Norfolk’s largest before 
the start of mass tourism. 
Furthermore, the new regime is also 
undermining the few opportunities 
the island had to engage internation-
ally, as there are fears that Norfolk 
might no longer be able to participate 
as a separate country in international 
sporting events, and its local legisla-
ture will also no longer be a member 
of the international Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association (cpa)—a 
particularly humiliating experience 
since, at the time of the abolition of 
the Legislative Assembly, Speaker 
David Buffett was sitting on the cpa 
Executive Committee (Adams 2016).
According to the now-applicable 
NSW legal system, local governance 
is handled by an elected regional 
council headed by a mayor. Council 
elections took place on 3 June 2016, 
and the results once again confirmed 
the majority position in favor of self-
determination and against the imposed 
changes. Out of the five elected mem-
bers, only one, Queenslander David 
Porter, advocated a pro-Australian 
position. A second member, Islander 
Rod Buffett, was politically more 
ambivalent, while the other three (for-
mer Chief Minister Lisle Snell, Robin 
Adams, and John McCoy) were nipd 
members advocating for the return of 
self-government (smh, 1 July 2016).
At the first council meeting, in a 
refurbished building in Burnt Pine 
to which some of the furniture sal-
vaged from the Legislative chambers 
had been relocated, Robin Adams 
was elected mayor and John McCoy 
deputy mayor. Engaged in the bal-
ancing act of being simultaneously 
a nipd board member and the per-
son charged with implementing the 
unwanted new system of local govern-
ment, Adams is probably the person 
with the least desirable job on the 
island. Having previously served for 
three years (2010–2013) as Speaker 
of the assembly and then as minister 
of cultural heritage and community 
services in Snell’s cabinet, Adams had 
been an outspoken advocate of more 
engagement by Norfolk Island in 
Pacific regional organizations, and in 
an article in the cpa magazine she had 
proposed resolving the impasse by fair 
and mutually respectful negotiations 
with the federal government, suggest-
ing that the Norfolk community serve 
as a bridge between Australia and the 
Pacific Islands region and thus be seen 
as a foreign policy asset for Canberra 
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rather than a colonial burden (Adams 
2014). 
Despite the island’s dire circum-
stances, Adams’s rise to its highest 
elective office is another example of 
the rising tide of women taking up 
political leadership in Pacific Island 
countries and territories. While Adams 
is the first elected female politi-
cal leader of Norfolk Island, there 
is a long history of women holding 
influential positions in island society, 
which may well be a heritage from the 
Tahitian side of the Islanders’ ancestry, 
as during the late eighteenth century 
Polynesian societies were far more 
gender balanced than those of West-
ern Europe. The most notable conse-
quence of this is the fact that Pitcairn 
and Norfolk are pioneers in granting 
women the right to vote. Women were 
formally granted suffrage on Pitcairn 
as early as 1838—the world’s first—
and this was continued on Norfolk 
when the Pitcairners relocated there 
in 1856, until women’s voting rights 
were temporarily abolished by colonial 
decree between 1897 and 1914 (Irving 
2013). Even though during the auton-
omous government period no women 
held the chief executive position, the 
Legislative Assembly usually had one 
to three female members out of a total 
of nine (Norfolk Island  Legislative 
Assembly 2015), a relatively high 
proportion compared to most other 
Pacific Island states and territories 
where, during the 1980s and 1990s, 
women members of Parliament were 
extremely rare. The structure of the 
Council of Elders, reestablished by 
the Legislative Assembly in 2008, also 
reflects the importance of women’s 
community leadership, consisting of 
an equal number of men and women 
to represent each of the eight original 
Pitcairn families (A Nobbs 2016, 12).
While Adams and the other council 
members have been trying to work 
within the new system and make 
the best of it for the time being, they 
quickly learned how extremely hard 
this was, as there was so little maneu-
vering space. Even on the local govern-
ment level that is purportedly left for 
the elected councilors to administer, 
the agenda has been preset by Can-
berra and enforced by its unelected 
agents such as the council’s general 
manager, Lotta Jackson. The council-
ors and mayor are expected to merely 
put up a brave front. In early August, 
Councilor Snell publicly expressed his 
frustration, stating that he had tried to 
work within the new system but that it 
was creating nothing but problems for 
the community (The Norfolk Islander, 
6 Aug 2016).
Certainly the new system of gov-
ernment came with some short-term 
benefits. As supposedly equal Aus-
tralian citizens living in a part of 
Australia, Norfolk Islanders now have 
access to Australian health care, social 
security, and welfare benefits, but all 
of this comes at enormous cost. The 
community that previously had its 
own social welfare and health care 
systems funded by moderate contribu-
tions and very few kinds of taxes is 
now burdened with manifold new and 
increased taxes. These include previ-
ously nonexistent income taxes as 
well as land rates (ie, property taxes). 
The latter, which are supposed to be 
the main source of income for the 
regional council, are especially going 
to be a heavy burden for many local 
families who are land rich but cash 
poor, in a society where, like elsewhere 
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in  Oceania, there is a strong cultural 
attachment to one’s land. At the same 
time, elderly locals are at risk of los-
ing their pensions, since under the 
new system their landholdings will 
be counted as assets when calculating 
their pensions, while previously, under 
Norfolk’s own laws, this was not the 
case (A Nobbs 2016, 12).
Overall, it appears that the qual-
ity of services and the quality of life 
is decreasing rather than increasing 
under the new regime. In a detailed 
report on the impacts of the forced 
changes, Andre Nobbs, former chief 
minister and technical advisor to 
the Council of Elders, described 
how health problems connected to 
stress and anxiety have dramatically 
increased in the 2015–2016 period, as 
many Islanders are concerned about 
the future of their livelihoods and their 
survival as a culturally distinct com-
munity (2016, 11).
Equally worrisome is the continuity 
of an authoritarian style of governance 
under the regional council system. 
At a public meeting on 10 August, 
at which the author was present, a 
“Community Strategic Plan” that 
had initially been drafted before the 
establishment of the Norfolk Island 
Regional Council and amended by the 
council under General Manager Jack-
son’s aegis (Norfolk Island Regional 
Council 2016) was presented, and 
people were asked for questions and 
comments. Under a pretext of “com-
munity engagement,” the meeting was 
micromanaged by Jackson to follow 
a predetermined script, and people 
who made critical comments question-
ing the legitimacy of the process as a 
whole were told disparagingly that 
their questions or comments were 
“irrelevant.” In a letter to the local 
newspaper, nipd board member Brett 
Sanderson expressed his indignation 
at the local community being “treated 
like a bunch of errant schoolchildren” 
at the meeting (The Norfolk Islander, 
13 Aug 2016). In many ways, the 
meeting confirmed that what Australia 
was imposing was an “unprecedented 
and regrettable return to the dark-
est days of colonialism,” to quote an 
nipd press release (nipd 2016).
The argument always brought 
forward to justify Australia’s heavy-
handed action, namely that the 
autonomous government between 
1979 and 2015 was a “failed experi-
ment,” does not hold up under closer 
scrutiny. As economist and writer 
Chris Nobbs pointed out, before the 
global financial crisis of 2008, Nor-
folk Island under its own government 
was performing well economically, 
and unlike most governments in the 
world it always managed to balance 
its budget. Attempts to diversify the 
economy away from its sole reliance 
on tourism and thereby produce a 
larger surplus always failed because 
of Canberra’s systematic obstruction 
of those projects, not because of any 
fault of the local government (the one 
exception being the miscalculated 
airline investment mentioned earlier). 
Canberra also never returned revenues 
derived from Norfolk’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone to the island. Under 
these circumstances, it is disingenuous 
to call a political system in existence 
for over three decades a “failed experi-
ment” only because after these first 
thirty years the territory faced finan-
cial difficulties mainly due to a global 
economic crisis (C Nobbs 2016b). 
Interestingly enough, such an analy-
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sis was also confirmed by a former 
Australian deputy administrator of 
the island, Jon Stanhope, who recalled 
the island being in very good overall 
shape during his tenure in the early 
1990s (abc, 23 June 2016). Statisti-
cally, according to the latest figures 
from 2014, Norfolk Island held the 
third-highest position in terms of gross 
domestic product (gdp) per capita and 
the Human Development Index among 
all Pacific Island states and territories, 
surpassed only by Guam and New 
Caledonia (Avakov 2016, 10, 70).
Looking back into history, Aus-
tralian desire for dominance and 
Norfolk hesitancy and resistance 
toward such policies is nothing new. 
The island, which from 1856 had 
been a self-governing colony within 
the British Empire, faced remarkably 
similar issues a century ago, when it 
lost its autonomy through similarly 
oppressive actions and was made into 
a dependency of the newly founded 
Commonwealth of Australia, with 
which it has had an “uneasy relation-
ship” ever since (O’Collins 2002). 
Even before the current crisis, while 
the autonomous government was still 
operational, Canberra was jealously 
guarding its influence and prevent-
ing any moves toward more connec-
tions between the island and the rest 
of Oceania. For instance, attempts to 
establish a satellite campus of Tonga’s 
‘Atenisi University on Norfolk Island 
in 2009 failed, as Australia would not 
give its permission (e-mail from Peter 
Maywald, Secretary of Government of 
Norfolk Island, to Michael Horowitz, 
Dean of ‘Atenisi University, 15 Oct 
2009). Similarly, in 2004, Australia for 
the first time interfered with the local 
system of governance by  imposing 
a change in voting rights to include 
all Australian citizens living on the 
island for six months while excluding 
non-Australian long-term residents 
who had previously been enfran-
chised (Irving 2013). The 2015–2016 
recolonization scheme will create even 
more drastic changes in that direc-
tion, as immigration by Australians is 
now unlimited while non-Australians 
(mainly New Zealanders and Britons), 
even if they have lived on the island 
for many decades, are now considered 
“foreigners” and must apply for resi-
dency visas (A Nobbs 2016, 13).
The unfolding colonial drama of 
Norfolk Island may also draw atten-
tion to the other little-known rem-
nants of Australia’s colonial empire, 
which besides Norfolk includes the 
Cocos-Keeling Islands and Christ-
mas Island in the Indian Ocean, both 
populated largely by Southeast Asians. 
Both are being run as overseas territo-
ries with only minimally empowered 
local municipal governments and 
are subject to a crude mix of legisla-
tion by an Australian state in which 
they have no representation (Western 
Australia) while being forced to vote 
in a distant federal electorate largely 
irrelevant to them and in which their 
small numbers do not matter (North-
ern Territory). Thus, Christmas and 
Cocos-Keeling might serve as exam-
ples of what Norfolk can expect from 
Canberra’s  neocolonial “reforms.” 
In terms of gdp per capita and the 
Human Development Index, the two 
islands have been lagging behind 
mainland Australia just as much as, if 
not more than, Norfolk Island under 
its autonomous government (Avakov 
2016, 10–11, 69–70)—a fact that 
dispels any notion of alleged eco-
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nomic benefits of direct Australian 
rule. On Cocos-Keeling, which in 
1984 had voted for integration with 
Australia in a UN-supervised vote, the 
Australian administration as recently 
as 2009 imposed such archaic and 
sinister colonial policies as policing 
and punishing not only local school-
children but also adult employees at 
their workplaces for speaking their 
native Cocos Malay instead of English 
(The Australian, 1 Sept 2009). Only 
in the face of local and international 
outrage and protests was this policy 
ended (Welsh 2015, 57–58). On 
Christmas Island (which for obscure 
reasons, unlike Cocos-Keeling, never 
had a vote of self-determination), 
Canberra imposed one of its notori-
ous asylum-seeker internment camps 
without consulting the local popula-
tion. Christmas has recently increased 
demands for more autonomy, ironi-
cally citing as a model the very status 
of Norfolk Island that Canberra was 
in the process of dismantling (sbs, 18 
Dec 2015).
Interestingly, the above-mentioned 
Jon Stanhope was also Australia’s 
administrator of the Indian Ocean 
territories from 2012 to 2014. A 
 diametrically opposite personal-
ity from Hardgrave, Stanhope tried 
to act responsibly and forwarded 
 grievances expressed by the local 
people of Christmas and Cocos-Keel-
ing to his superiors in Canberra, but 
all of them were ignored. On leaving 
the post, Stanhope publicly apolo-
gized for the failure to deliver good 
governance and democracy to the 
people of the Indian Ocean islands 
(A Nobbs 2016, 7). Together with 
Emeritus Professor Roger Wettenhall, 
Stanhope has been one of the most 
strident critics of the Norfolk Island 
recolonization scheme and published 
several editorials to raise awareness 
on the issue among the Australian 
public (Stanhope and Wettenhall 
2015; Wettenhall 2015).
It is indeed hypocritical that 
 Australia has been condemning 
Pacific Island states (such as Fiji 
after the 2006 military coup) for an 
alleged lack of democracy, while it is 
busy implementing antidemocratic 
policies on Norfolk Island. This is 
in stark contrast to New Zealand, 
which has also at times been criti-
cized for a  similar policy of prescrip-
tive  interference into Pacific nations’ 
domestic affairs, but which at the 
same time is much less hypocritical, 
as it has a much better decoloniza-
tion record. Of the two New Zea-
land–affiliated Pacific Island entities 
of similar size to Norfolk Island, Niue 
has been a self-governing nation in 
free association with New Zealand 
since 1974, like the much larger Cook 
Islands have been since 1965, and 
while Tokelau, which did not vote in 
sufficient numbers for a similar politi-
cal status in 2006, remains a non-
self-governing territory under New 
Zealand  sovereignty, it has a largely 
autonomous local government exercis-
ing at least as much authority as the 
Norfolk Island government had under 
the 1979 law.
While certainly not perfect, New 
Zealand’s policies toward Niue and 
Tokelau have clearly set a bench-
mark on how to act responsibly 
toward small dependent territories in 
the region and respect their right of 
self-determination. It is indeed both 
 astonishing and saddening that Aus-
tralia appears to be unwilling  
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to learn from its sister nation across 
the Tasman Sea in this respect and 
instead perpetuates outdated colonial  
policies.
lorenz gonschor
I would like to thank Andre 
Nobbs, Robin Adams, and Chris 
Nobbs for providing helpful informa-
tion and for reading earlier drafts of 
this review.
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Pitcairn
The islands of Pitcairn, Henderson, 
Ducie, and Oeno (commonly known 
as Pitcairn) make up a single terri-
tory, the last remaining United King-
dom Overseas Territory (ukot) in 
the Pacific Ocean. Pitcairn, the only 
inhabited island of the group, had a 
total resident population of thirty-
nine—a historically low figure—at the 
start of 2016. The entire population 
lives in the lone settlement, Adams-
town. The only way of accessing the 
island is by sea, but because of the 
difficult terrain, ships must moor 
offshore, with longboats operating 
between the ships and Bounty Bay. 
Due to its isolation, its small and 
aging population, and the high level 
of subsidy that is given by the UK 
government, there are concerns over 
the future viability of the settlement. 
Therefore, during the period under 
review there was significant focus on 
strengthening its repopulation strategy, 
improving the island’s infrastructure, 
encouraging more tourist arrivals, 
and working closely with the Euro-
pean Union (EU) on several projects. 
However, much of the good work was 
undermined by reignited concerns over 
child safety and the decision of the 
United Kingdom to withdraw from the 
European Union. All of these issues, 
which are closely interlinked, are con-
sidered in this review.
A fundamental challenge for Pit-
cairn is its very small and declining 
population, which is also aging. Fewer 
than thirty people are economically 
active, and a majority of these are over 
fifty years old. Most starkly for the 
future, the number of residents in the 
twenty-to-thirty age group is in the 
low single figures. Once young people 
move abroad—usually to New Zea-
land—to advance their education, they 
rarely return. In addition, with only 
a handful of women being of child-
bearing age, the birthrate is not high 
enough to sustain population  levels 
(UK Department for International 
Development 2015). So apart from a 
rising number of births, there are two 
other options for increasing the popu-
lation: the return of former residents 
and their families, and new immi-
grants coming to the island. In order 
to help facilitate these, the Pitcairn 
Island Council (pic) in 2013 agreed 
to a repopulation plan to stabilize the 
population at around fifty.
In the face of the extremely limited 
initial interest on the part of diasporic 
Islanders and new immigrants in set-
tling in Pitcairn, the pic undertook 
a review, which was completed in 
November 2015. A key part of this 
was a redesigned and more user-
friendly website, including a new 
promotional film, which was intended 
to allow those interested in migrating 
to Pitcairn to begin the application 
process more easily and in a more 
informed way (Pitcairn Miscellany 
2015a; pic 2015c). In addition, new 
procedures were approved for immi-
grants applying for council land. 
After the changes were made, a small 
number of applications were received, 
although none had resulted in any 
new arrivals by the end of the period 
under review.
The reasons for the lack of success 
can be seen in a survey of the Pitcairn 
diaspora (Solomon and Burnett 2014). 
It found that the vast majority of those 
living elsewhere are reluctant to return 
because of concerns over child safety 
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and a belief that “on-island social 
norms do not conform to acceptable 
international norms” (Solomon and 
Burnett 2014, 41). These concerns 
apply to other potential immigrants 
too. They relate back to the late 1990s 
when serious allegations of systematic 
sexual abuse of children were made 
against a large proportion of the adult 
male population. Ultimately eight men 
were convicted, including a recently 
serving mayor. Significant efforts 
have been made, including during the 
period under review, to strengthen 
child safeguarding. For example, the 
“Child Matters” training, a child- 
protection studies program provided 
by a New Zealand company, was 
rolled out (pic 2015a).
However, much of the good work 
around child safety was undermined 
when in March 2016 former Mayor 
Michael Warren was found guilty 
of downloading scores of hardcore 
child-abuse images and films (Marks 
2016). In response, a further initia-
tive was taken in May 2016 when the 
pic agreed to work with the Internet 
Watch Foundation in a scheme funded 
by the UK Foreign and Common-
wealth Office (fco). The foundation 
will provide a reporting portal for 
child-abuse imagery (pic 2016b). Not-
withstanding, there remain concerns 
over the safety of children in Pitcairn, 
and thus the UK government retains a 
travel advisory for the island, stating 
that any visits or settlements involv-
ing children under sixteen years of 
age must be authorized by the Pitcairn 
Island Office in New Zealand (UK 
Government Website 2016).
In tandem with the (so far unsuc-
cessful) attempts to attract new set-
tlers, the pic also recognizes that the 
economy of Pitcairn must offer more 
opportunities for potential immigrants 
and investors. For many years Pitcairn 
was able to pay its own way; the sale 
of stamps and later the registration 
fees from the “.pn” Internet domain 
name were significant revenue earners. 
Recently, however, income from these 
sources has fallen, while expenditures 
have increased considerably, particu-
larly in regard to shipping, telecom-
munications, and medical services (in 
part because of the aging population). 
Further, funding is required for the 
provision of part-time public-sector 
employment. The result is that domes-
tic revenue represents only 5 percent 
of the Pitcairn government’s finances. 
To make up the shortfall, the UK 
government has provided budgetary 
aid to the island since 2004. For the 
2015–2016 fiscal year, this totaled 
£2.91 million (us$4.34 million) (UK 
Department for International Develop-
ment 2015).
In order to create a wider pool of 
job opportunities and to reduce reli-
ance on budgetary aid from London, 
a number of initiatives are ongoing. 
 Perhaps the most significant is the 
building of a jetty at Tedside, on the 
northwestern side of the island, and 
the upgrading of the road linking 
 Tedside to Adamstown. It is hoped 
that once the jetty is completed, 
tenders will be able to more eas-
ily transport cruise ship passengers 
to the island, and so the number of 
cruise ship visitors will increase (at 
present about 800 to 1,000 passen-
gers set foot on the island each year). 
This in turn should have a benefit for 
on-island tourist industries, such as 
guesthouses and sales of crafts and 
curios. However, progress on the jetty 
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and road projects during the year was 
slow because of poor weather and sea 
conditions (Pitcairn Miscellany 2015b, 
2016b).
A related initiative was the 
approval by the pic in October 2015 
of the 2015–2019 Sustainable Tour-
ism Development Master Plan (pic 
2015b). The objective of the plan is 
to “capitalise on the Pitcairn Islands 
unique points of difference, its Bounty 
heritage, its endemic flora and fauna, 
its endemic birds, its pristine marine 
environment, its prehistoric history, 
and its natural beauty” (Government 
of Pitcairn Islands 2016). More partic-
ularly, the intention is to increase rev-
enues from tourism, including higher 
landing fees, and to boost employment 
opportunities in the sector.
Another development that may 
enhance Pitcairn’s economy was the 
March 2015 announcement of the UK 
government’s intention to create the 
largest continuous marine reserve in 
the world, covering 834,000 square 
kilometers. The seas around Pitcairn 
are believed to be home to more than 
1,200 species of fish, marine mam-
mals, and birds, some of which are 
unique to the region. The area also 
supports the world’s deepest and best-
developed coral reef. A report pro-
duced for the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office by the Pew Charitable 
Trusts, pic, and National Geographic 
Society suggests that the reserve could 
build a sustainable economic future 
for Pitcairn’s resident population, 
based on increased tourism and permit 
fees and other maintenance grants. 
The report also claims that “creating 
work and jobs in conservation tour-
ism could play a key role in helping 
encourage young adults within the 
community to remain on the islands 
and attracting new residents” (Blue 
Ventures 2013, 11). 
In the latter half of 2015, the UK 
government, in tandem with several 
nongovernmental organizations, dis-
cussed how tracking and surveillance 
in the reserve would be undertaken 
(pic 2015c). Then, in March 2016, the 
first details were revealed (bbc News 
2016). An ocean drone had begun 
work the previous month identifying 
illegal fishing in the reserve. The data 
that are collected will be sent back to 
a satellite watch room based in the 
Harwell Science and Innovation Cam-
pus in Oxfordshire. Any unauthor-
ized trawlers will then be prosecuted. 
Funding is being provided by the UK 
government, the Swiss Bertarelli Foun-
dation, and the Pew Charitable Trusts. 
The wider work around how the 
reserve could contribute to Pitcairn’s 
economy was much less advanced, 
however.
Although the UK government 
provides financial support to cover 
much of Pitcairn’s budget, the Euro-
pean Union is also an important 
source of assistance. For example, the 
Tedside harbor project is funded by 
Brussels under the Ninth European 
Development Fund (edf). Several 
other initiatives were either completed 
or planned during the year. In July 
2015, the Pacific Territories Initia-
tive for Regional Management of 
the Environment (integre) project 
to prevent erosion at St Paul’s Point 
(on the far eastern tip of the island) 
and Ailihau (on the southern coast) 
was concluded, with assistance from 
several workers from French Polynesia 
(Pitcairn Miscellany 2015c). Much of 
the steep areas were protected with 
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mats before plants were added. In the 
first evaluation undertaken, the work 
at St Paul’s had brought some success, 
but at Ailihau the results were more 
mixed (Pitcairn Miscellany 2015c). A 
further integre-sponsored initiative 
took place in the following spring, 
when a team of experts visited Pit-
cairn, providing advice on soil fertil-
ity, fisheries, and waste management 
(Pitcairn Miscellany 2016a).
In addition, a public meeting was 
held on 14 December 2015 to discuss 
future funding proposals to be sup-
ported by the European Union. At the 
meeting, upcoming projects under the 
Tenth edf were discussed, primarily 
focused around upgrading infrastruc-
ture to enhance the tourist experience 
(Pitcairn Miscellany 2015d). Included 
in the edf-10 proposal is a purpose-
built vessel, designed to deliver pas-
sengers from ship to shore and back; 
the surfacing of several key roads; the 
installation of new road signs; and 
the construction of a new community 
center, museum, and general store. 
These projects are considered key to 
promoting the tourism sector and the 
economy of Pitcairn more generally.
To confirm the importance of the 
Pitcairn–European Union link, repre-
sentatives from Pitcairn attended the 
Overseas Countries and Territories 
(oct)–EU Forum in Brussels between 
23 and 26 February. This is a meet-
ing that is held annually involving the 
twenty-four octs, their metropolitan 
powers (United Kingdom, Denmark, 
France, and the Netherlands), and 
the European Commission. A range 
of issues was discussed, including 
climate change, sustainable energy, the 
implementation of edf-11 program-
ming, and the promotion of research, 
education, and innovation. In addi-
tion, several summits were held on 
the margins of the main gathering, 
including trilateral meetings with the 
European Union, the member states, 
and the Overseas Territories, and 
regional trilaterals with the European 
Union, French Polynesia, New Cale-
donia, Wallis and Futuna, and Pitcairn 
in attendance.
However, these meetings took 
place in the shadow of the impend-
ing vote in the United Kingdom on 
whether the country should “Remain” 
or “Leave” the European Union. 
Due to the important level of sup-
port that Pitcairn and other United 
Kingdom Overseas Territories receive 
from Brussels, there was concern over 
what might happen if the UK voted to 
leave the EU. As a consequence, the 
Political Council of the United King-
dom  Overseas Territories  Association 
(ukota), at its annual meeting in 
November 2015, mandated the asso-
ciation to commission a report on the 
relationship between the ukots and 
the EU. The overall aim of the report 
was not to force the ukots onto the 
campaign agenda (thus Gibraltar, 
whose government was in favor of the 
UK remaining in the EU and whose 
population was eligible to vote, was 
excluded from the report), but to 
demonstrate the value of the EU to 
the ukots.
Part I of the report, which consid-
ered the benefits to the ukots of EU 
support, concluded that the relation-
ship is very positive to the ukots in 
terms of economic and environmental 
cooperation, development assis-
tance, and policy dialogue. Further, 
they now have a “stronger and more 
independent voice” in the EU, which 
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has enhanced policy outcomes (Clegg 
2016, 17).
On 23 June 2016, the UK voted to 
leave the EU, with 52 percent support-
ing that choice and 48 percent voting 
to remain. The result was unexpected, 
and as a consequence the UK gov-
ernment does not yet have a clear 
plan in place to negotiate the coun-
try’s withdrawal, nor is there a clear 
sense of how any future relationship 
between the UK and the EU might be 
organized. The outcome will likely 
also have a significant impact on Pit-
cairn and the other ukots. Pitcairn’s 
relationship with the EU is dependent 
on the UK (via part IV of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European 
Union), and when the UK leaves, 
Pitcairn’s support from Brussels will 
most likely end unless some special 
arrangement is worked out that pro-
vides Pitcairn with continued access to 
the European Development Fund. 
So for Pitcairn—which is already 
struggling to survive and sees EU 
funding as crucial for its future 
sustainability and development—the 
process of “Brexit” is extremely con-
cerning. Only time will tell how the 
undertaking of UK withdrawal from 
the EU will conclude, but in the short 
run  Pitcairn must secure the EU fund-
ing that it has been promised. As long 
as the UK remains an EU member and 
does not renege on its funding com-
mitments, Pitcairn will benefit from 
EU support. Therefore, the disburse-
ment of funds—under both edf-10 
and edf-11 and the regional funding 
envelope—should be agreed on as 
soon as possible, and once committed 
the monies should be secured so that 
the planned projects can proceed. Even 
if these projects run beyond 2020, 
they will most likely be completed. 
Thus it is vital for Pitcairn, with the 
support and commitment of the UK, 
to conclude the necessary financing 
negotiations in the near future.
A final issue to consider is the 
political system and its subtext in Pit-
cairn, in particular the role of women. 
The Pitcairn Island Council consists 
of a mayor, deputy mayor, and five 
councillors. In addition, there are 
three nonvoting, ex-officio members: 
the governor, the deputy governor, and 
the administrator. In practice, only the 
administrator will normally attend pic 
meetings. The administrator reports 
directly to the governor, and the gov-
ernor may direct the administrator to 
take certain actions. The mayor, who 
acts as chairman, is elected by popu-
lar vote for a three-year term, while 
the other members are elected for 
two-year terms. There are no politi-
cal parties. In order to vote, persons 
must be eighteen years of age or older 
and have been resident on Pitcairn 
for between one and three years. The 
qualification period is determined by 
the particular status of the individual. 
Anyone able to vote may also stand 
for election, so long as he or she has 
not been sentenced to imprisonment 
for three months or more in the previ-
ous five years.
This last provision has been par-
ticularly important for the representa-
tion of women in the political process. 
Historically, the pic was dominated 
by men, but since the child sex-abuse 
cases, women have taken a greater 
role, and it was no different in the pic 
elections held on 9 November 2015. 
Voters cast their ballots for a deputy 
mayor and five pic members, with 
women filling five of the six posi-
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tions, including Deputy Mayor Brenda 
Christian (Pitcairn Miscellany 2015a). 
It is very difficult to definitely prove 
that the greater role for women on 
the pic has influenced the nature of 
public policy, but there are indications 
to suggest that efforts to improve child 
safeguarding have been strengthened. 
Furthermore, other changes are being 
enacted, including the agreement that 
the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (cedaw) should be extended 
to Pitcairn (pic 2016a; see also Lee, 
this issue). So because of the particular 
circumstances that have surrounded 
Pitcairn over the last decade and 
a half, the role of women in local 
politics has become more important. 
Even though in most cases there has 
been continuity in the political agenda 
around the major issue of securing 
the long-term viability of Pitcairn, 
there has been some greater focus and 
commitment with regard to enhanc-
ing the rights of women and trying 
to strengthen child-safeguarding 
measures. It should also be noted 
there has been a strong push by the 
UK  government to make progress on 
these issues.
The past year in Pitcairn has been 
a case of one of two steps forward 
and one—or even possibly two—steps 
back. On the positive side, there is a 
clear recognition that, unless some-
thing is done to attract new settlers 
and to develop the economy, the long 
history of Pitcairn with a permanent 
resident population may well end. 
Thus, significant efforts were made 
to reenergize the repopulation strat-
egy and enhance key aspects of the 
economy, particularly the island’s 
infrastructure. Little tangible differ-
ence was seen in either the size of the 
population or the functioning of the 
economy, but at least the foundation 
stones are being laid for a potentially 
brighter future. However, much of 
this good work was undermined by 
two developments. The first was the 
March 2016 conviction of former 
Mayor Michael Warren for download-
ing hardcore child-abuse images and 
films. This was a very unfortunate 
reminder of Pitcairn’s recent dark past. 
The second was the June 2016 deci-
sion of the UK to leave the EU. In the 
medium term, this may well result in 
the ending of a vital source of funding, 
putting at risk Pitcairn’s future plans 
for economic development. There is 
no certainty that the UK government 
will cover the shortfall. So despite all 
the initiatives and projects that were 
pushed through by the pic during the 
year under review, it has ended on a 
pessimistic note.
peter clegg
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Rapa Nui
During the review period, Rapa Nui 
national leaders affirmed movement 
toward self-determination in the con-
text of local, state, and global biopo-
litical forces that threaten the sustain-
able future of the Rapa Nui people, 
territory, and resources. Engaging the 
spirit of Angata, the first Rapa Nui 
woman to valiantly challenge such 
forces as they articulated in 1914 
(McCall 1997, 117), many political 
voices and actions for social justice 
by leading contemporary Rapa Nui 
women are highlighted in this review, 
including Lolita Tuki, Erity Teave, 
Elisa Riroroko, Anakena Manu-
tomatoma, Mama Piru (Piru Hucke 
Atan), and Marisol Hito. 
Conflict over the March 2015 
reclamation of “ancestral lands” 
(kāiŋa tupuna) and “ancestral valu-
ables” (hauha‘a tupuna)—which the 
state had developed into a national 
park (El Parque Nacional Rapa Nui) 
in the 1930s without consulting the 
Rapa Nui people—had temporarily 
been resolved in April 2015 through 
an agreement between Rapa Nui 
national leaders and Chilean state 
government representatives (Young 
2016a), but the conflict resumed by 
June 2015. Erity Teave, vice president 
of Parlamento Rapa Nui and president 
of Honui (two grassroots political 
organizations engaging movements 
for Rapa Nui self-determination 
entangled in the conflict), explained 
that the dispute centers around 
incommensurable understandings and 
experiences of the island: for Rapa 
Nui people, the sites that the state 
and global actors recognize as part 
of a “park for  recreation” are actu-
ally “sacred places” (vahi tapu) that 
must be protected by “customary law” 
(derecho consuetudinario) as a taina 
henua—that is, an “island” (henua) 
of “siblings/relatives” (taina) (Teave, 
pers comm, 12 Aug 2016). The world-
famous moai statues at the center of 
vahi tapu are considered by Rapa Nui 
people to be “spiritual tombstones” 
that “protect the land and the blood 
matrix to which each clan belongs” 
(M Hitorangi 2013); as Mama Piru, 
a Parlamento Rapa Nui member, has 
stressed during the conflict, the moai 
“talk” with the Rapa Nui people who 
are the “children of their children” 
(ec, 25 Sept 2015). Thus, what is at 
stake is not only the “moral economy” 
for governing cultural heritage but 
also the epistemological and ontologi-
cal foundations of Rapa Nui being 
and becoming as a nation and people 
(Young 2016c). What the state and 
global forces desire to administer as a 
Chilean “lawscape” (Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos 2015, 38–106), that 
is, a place that spatializes people, 
resources, and territories in terms of 
Chilean law, Rapa Nui national lead-
ers want to protect as a genealogical 
“relationscape” (Manning 2009) that 
connects Rapa Nui present and future 
“extended families” (hua‘ai) to their 
ancestral spiritual ecology and living 
cultural heritage. 
A 4 June 2015 letter to Chilean 
President Michelle Bachelet signed by 
Erity Teave and Leviante Araki, presi-
dent of Parlamento Rapa Nui, reports 
that conflict resumed as state police 
began to “intimidate” Rapa Nui at the 
vahi tapu they were protecting while 
managing everyday tourism access. By 
10 August 2015, the Chilean National 
Institute of Human Rights noted that 
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dialogue between the state and Rapa 
Nui leaders had finally broken down 
(indh 2016). Following public radio 
announcements requesting that tour-
ists provide “voluntary contributions” 
to gain access to Rapa Nui ancestral 
territories beginning 15 August (ec, 
16 Aug 2015), President Araki and 
Mario Tuki (a Parlamento Rapa Nui 
member and former representative of 
the Chilean government-organized 
Commission for the Development 
of Easter Island [codeipa]), were 
arrested at the entrance to the Orongo 
ceremonial village on 15 August as 
they began collecting entrance fees 
from tourists. The National Forest 
Corporation of Chile (conaf), funded 
by the Chilean Ministry of Agriculture 
that manages the park, not noting the 
fees were voluntary, declared the acts 
“illegal,” and state officials called for 
the closure of the office of Parlamento 
Rapa Nui to restore “public order”  
(Parque Nacional Rapa Nui, 15 Aug 
2015). In response to the arrests, 
President Araki publically emphasized 
that they were simply “protecting” the 
Rapa Nui “sacred sites” and “ances-
tral property” (ec, 17 Aug 2015). 
Contextualizing Chilean admin-
istration of vahi tapu as failing the 
Rapa Nui people while accumulating 
profits for the state and associated 
corporations, President Araki refused 
to recognize the authority of Chilean 
government organizations like conaf 
and codeipa in Rapa Nui (ec, 17 
Aug 2015), insisting that “this is not 
Chile, this is Rapa Nui” (ec, 20 Aug 
2015). Marisol Hito, a leader of her 
family’s struggle to reclaim ancestral 
land from the corporate five-star 
 Hangaroa Eco-Village and Spa devel-
opment at the heart of the 2010–2011 
violent conflicts (Young 2016b, 267), 
insightfully supported Araki’s critical 
perspective in asking during the cur-
rent conflict, “Who prosecutes conaf, 
which took over the management of 
our resources, without consulting 
anybody?” (Biobio, 28 Aug 2015). 
The challenges by President Araki and 
Marisol Hito foreground not only a 
critical question in biopolitical legal 
theory (what is the “Law of law”? 
[Zartaloudis 2010, 1]) but also a ques-
tion that makes practical sense, given 
that the state’s own recent truth com-
mission acknowledged that the current 
configuration of the island primar-
ily into a national park and a small 
reserve of land for the people reflects 
a history of unjust state disposses-
sion. The commission recognized that, 
for decades, the state held Rapa Nui 
people against their will under military 
laws, behind barbed wire, without 
rights of citizenship—in violation of 
the 1888 Agreement of Wills that 
would have established a political 
relationship between Chile and Rapa 
Nui that recognized the chiefly titles 
of Rapa Nui leaders for governing all 
island territory (Gobierno de Chile 
2008, 261–263). Araki’s and Hito’s 
critiques draw attention to history that 
suggests that the “Law” of Chilean 
law is based in what Walter Benjamin 
would consider “lawmaking” and 
“law-preserving” violence, not social 
justice (1986, 284). The military laws 
that constituted the dispossessed place 
of the Rapa Nui people on the island 
in violation of the 1888 Agreement of 
Wills can be understood as extended 
through the enactment of further 
Chilean laws that preserve the origi-
nal spatial violence by managing the 
island as primarily a national park for 
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tourism rather than as the sacred place 
of its indigenous people.
On the same day of the criminal-
ization of Rapa Nui leaders, the local 
state prosecutor, Raul Ochoa, called 
for the collection of materials related 
to crimes from the office of Parla-
mento Rapa Nui and the closure of 
that institution pending investigation. 
Parlamento Rapa Nui women, led by 
Elisa Riroroko, refused to provide the 
police any materials because the police 
lacked a court order (ec, 16 Aug 
2015), and they closed the office on 
their own terms, according to the state 
(Gobernacion Isla de Pascua, 17 Aug 
2015). Following the failed police 
search and seizure of the office, crimi-
nalization continued. President Araki 
was again arrested—this time for 
entering ancestral territory in viola-
tion of the conditions of release for his 
first arrest (ec, 28 Aug 2015). Island 
judge Maria Fernanda Cornejo further 
mandated that Rapa Nui elder Matias 
Riroroko and his daughter Elisa be 
held in police custody for 120 days for 
crimes related to resistance to the Par-
lamento Rapa Nui office searches and 
seizure. Riroroko, seventy-two years 
old, was arrested 26 August at the 
airport of Santiago, Chile, preventing 
his participation in a National Con-
gressional hearing on human rights 
conflicts in Rapa Nui. He testified to 
media that he experienced abuse while 
detained by the police and during 
juridical processing. Initially held in a 
small, cold room at the Arturo Merino 
Benitez airport without any chair to 
sit on and stripped of all belongings, 
Riroroko asserted that he was denied 
access to his personal attorney. On 
transfer to the Santiago Uno prison 
(where he stayed for three days until 
returning to Rapa Nui on 29 August), 
he said that prison guards “verbally 
tortured” him in the jail cell (Biobio, 
28 Aug 2015). Reminiscent of Chilean 
government treatment of the indige-
nous Mapuche people under its highly 
criticized anti-terrorism law (Richards 
2013, 212), during criminal process-
ing in which Riroroko was assisted 
only by a court-appointed attorney, 
state Prosecutor Raul Ochoa accused 
him and other Rapa Nui people of 
being “terrorists” and compared 
them to the “Nazis of the Hitler era.” 
Riroroko’s arrest was upheld, as the 
court considered him “a threat to the 
state and a danger to the community” 
(ec, 1 Oct 2015). As Riroroko has 
documented asthma problems and a 
heart condition and was denied access 
to his medicine during processing, he 
maintains the state forces jeopardized 
his life (prn, 1 Sept 2015). Riroroko’s 
daughter Elisa, arrested on 26 August 
in Rapa Nui, was formally processed 
on 30 August and held under house 
arrest and, like her father, forbid-
den to leave the island. The charges 
prevented her from attending the 
30th Session of the Commission on 
Human Rights of the United Nations 
in Geneva, Switzerland, where she had 
intended to speak on the plight of the 
Rapa Nui nation (ec, 1 Oct 2015).
Rapa Nui leaders responded with 
local, regional, and international 
political organization. On 28 August, 
Rapa Nui people organized a pro-
test at the office of the governor. 
Rafael “Rinko” Tuki, a Parlamento 
Rapa Nui member as well as leading 
representative of Rapa Nui within 
the state- organized development 
institution for the indigenous peoples 
of Chile (conadi), denounced the 
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criminalization and raid of Parlamento 
Rapa Nui in a  letter submitted to the 
governor. In addition to calling for 
the release of Matias and Elisa Riro-
roko, he reproached the government 
for colonial treatment and systematic 
violation of Rapa Nui rights to self-
determination for over a century (prn, 
1 Sept 2015). He followed local con-
demnation of Chile with a visit with 
government leaders of the Embassy 
of Bolivia that led to a meeting with 
Bolivia’s indigenous president, Evo 
Morales, during the World People’s 
Conference on Climate Change held 
in Bolivia on 12 October; he requested 
help from Bolivia for Rapa Nui’s 
decolonization under UN principles of 
international law (Qué Pasa, 23 Oct 
2015). Erity Teave helped coordinate 
international legal representation of 
the Rapa Nui people with the Indian 
Law Resource Center (ilrc) of Wash-
ington dc, which led to the filing of a 
request for precautionary measures at 
the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (iachr) of the Organization 
of American States—the second filing 
in five years (Young 2016b, 266). 
Attorney Robert Coulter, ilrc execu-
tive director, described “the arrests 
and detention of prominent Rapa Nui 
leaders” as “repressive measures” that 
“violate the human rights of all people 
of Rapa Nui by interfering with their 
access to their sacred sites and the 
burial places of their ancestors” (ilrc, 
28 Aug 2015). On 18 September, 
Santi Hitorangi, a leading member of 
Parlamento Rapa Nui at the United 
Nations, voiced his call for interna-
tional support of the right of Rapa 
Nui people to self-determination at 
the meeting of the UN Human Rights 
Council in Geneva (S Hitorangi 2015). 
In a context in which Marta Hotus 
had been questionably replaced as 
island governor by Carolina Hotus 
in September by Chilean President 
Bachelet (Biobio, 10 Sept 2015), on 25 
October 2015 conflict intensified as 
the state government conducted a vote 
on the island concerning the future 
administration of the Parque Nacional 
Rapa Nui. The ballot included one 
primary question (whether or not the 
voter agreed with co-administration of 
the national park) and sub-questions 
about which entity should organize, 
oversee, and manage the co-adminis-
tration (Gobernacion Isla de Pascua, 
23 Oct 2015). The results of the 
vote were released the following day, 
with 86.6 percent of voters favor-
ing co-administration and with lists 
enumerating variable answers to the 
sub-questions (Parque Nacional Rapa 
Nui, 26 Oct 2015). Aaron Cavieres, 
conaf executive director, character-
ized the day of voting as exhibiting 
“a very participatory and transparent 
process,” in which the majority of the 
votes of the Rapa Nui people demon-
strated support of “co-administration” 
of the park (La Tercera, 26 Oct 2015). 
Hans Peter Orellana, the Chilean 
minister of social development, also 
applauded the process, emphasizing 
that “there were no acts of violence,” 
that all “was normal,” and that the 
government acted in “the utmost good 
faith” (ec, 27 Oct 2015). 
What the Chilean government nor-
malized, many observers would likely 
find deeply problematic. During the 
island-based voting at the local school, 
Rapa Nui national leaders (including 
those with positions in the offices of 
Chilean government administering 
the island like Rinko Tuki as well 
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as codeipa representative Anakena 
Manutomatoma) staged a rally beside 
the school at Atamu Tekena plaza 
urging the Rapa Nui people to abstain 
from voting. Chilean police inter-
vened to silence the megaphones of 
Rapa Nui leaders, and independent 
observers feared bloodshed (ec, 27 
Oct 2015). Rapa Nui leaders present 
in the rally included not only staunch 
nationalist leaders like President 
Araki, Mama Piru, and elder Lolita 
Tuki, but also former state-appointed 
Governor Marta Hotus (prn, 27 Oct 
2015). Representative Manutomatoma 
highlighted that the number of voters 
who cast a ballot (294 out of a pos-
sible 2,005) was clearly a sign that the 
process did not reflect “the decision 
of the people.” She emphasized the 
people had overwhelmingly demanded 
a postponement of the voting because 
the questions had been imposed by the 
state. She further reported that during 
actual consultations with the Rapa 
Nui people over the preceding months, 
representatives of 23 of the 36 Rapa 
Nui hua‘ai (extended families/clans) 
did not approve of co-administration 
at all; they wanted full administration 
in the hands of the Rapa Nui people 
consistent with the signed agree-
ment of April 2015. Rinko Tuki also 
vehemently rejected the voting results 
and insisted that conaf and the state 
do not “have the authority to define 
the future of the overall management 
of our ancestral territory” (ec, 27 Oct 
2015). 
As the Chilean government was 
securing the continued territorializa-
tion of vahi tapu as resources of a 
national park, it expanded its ambi-
tions into the ocean when Chilean 
President Bachelet announced on 
5 October the state’s desire to build 
one of the world’s largest marine 
conservation parks around Rapa Nui, 
during the “Our Ocean” conference in 
Valparaiso attended by US Secretary 
of State John Kerry and entrepre-
neur Richard Branson. The proposed 
marine park would encompass nearly 
244,000 square miles and offer sanctu-
ary for marine life, free of commercial 
fishing. Its development is organized 
in partnership with Pew Charitable 
Trusts pending consultation with the 
indigenous Rapa Nui people (Vaughn 
2015). Rinko Tuki criticized the pro-
posal, saying it was “not born from 
the initiative of Rapa Nui people, but 
is a packaged proposal from a foreign 
ngo [nongovermental organization]” 
that is part of broader “colonial” 
projects on the island like the national 
park (ec, 3 Oct 2015). Anakena 
Manutomatoma concordantly orga-
nized fellow codeipa representatives 
to submit a letter of protest to the 
government (prn, 6 Oct 2015). The 
Indian Law Resource Center also 
supported Rapa Nui concerns, given 
that the proposed marine conservation 
park would further “restrict access to 
the resources Rapa Nui are dependent 
upon and further diminish their abil-
ity to pass along cultural traditions” 
(ilrc, 28 Jan 2016). Historically, it is 
noteworthy that it was at the height of 
the 2010–2011 conflicts in Rapa Nui 
that the Chilean government initiated 
inquiry into a marine park around 
Rapa Nui on 23 February 2011 
(National Geographic 2011). Is it 
mere coincidence that the state sought 
control of the marine environment of 
Rapa Nui during the height of the two 
greatest island conflicts in the decade, 
or is this part of a broader governmen-
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tal strategy? Internationally, conserva-
tion projects are certainly known to 
be part of global and state strategies 
to displace indigenous peoples from 
coveted territories and resources 
(Dowie 2009), a strategy Chile is 
documented as applying against its 
indigenous Mapuche people (Richards 
2009, 71–74). Such projects are seen 
as tools for transforming indigenous 
peoples into “environmental subjects” 
who become “accomplices” of global 
and state development goals (Agrawal 
2005, 214–217), thus obstructing their 
movement toward becoming self-
determining subjects in control of their 
own resources and territories. 
While the government “consulta-
tion” regarding Parque National Rapa 
Nui was considered a failure by the 
Rapa Nui people, a consultation on 
24 January 2016 regarding the regula-
tion of migration and residency on the 
island was broadly considered success-
ful. It is calculated that 1,411 votes 
were registered and that 97 percent 
voted in favor of regulating residency. 
codeipa representatives strongly sup-
ported the results and initiated formal 
processes to urge the state legislature 
to enact the bill in March (prn, 1 Feb 
2016). During a late April 2016 visit 
to Rapa Nui (a rare trip for state dig-
nitaries), Chilean President  Bachelet 
affirmed her support of a bill that 
would limit both Chilean and foreign 
visits, establish penalties for violation, 
and increase monitoring of environ-
mental impacts of tourism and other 
development projects (La Tercera, 30 
April 2016). However, as the period 
under review ended, the bill had not 
been formally legislated and Chilean 
Senator Francisco Chahuán expressed 
concern that the time to implement the 
bill was running out (Biobio, 8 July 
2016). 
The review period closes amid 
heightened international monitoring 
and politico-legal organization among 
Rapa Nui people. The aggressive 
Chilean government strategies docu-
mented during the period—criminaliz-
ing Rapa Nui political leaders in ways 
that obstructed their participation 
in human rights assemblies; replace-
ment of an island governor who was 
sometimes sympathetic to Rapa Nui 
movements toward self-determination; 
and dispossession of Rapa Nui pro-
tection of their vahi tapu as well as 
attempted expansion of Chilean and 
global power over Rapa Nui marine 
resources—gained the attention of 
the UN Office of the High Commis-
sioner of Human Rights (ohchr). 
UN Special Rapporteur for Indigenous 
Peoples Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, in a 
letter to the ohchr (Tauli-Corpuz 
2016), challenged the criminalization 
of Rapa Nui leaders and the treatment 
of their cultural heritage and natural 
resources in terms of articles 7, 11, 12, 
25, 26, and 31 of the UN Declaration 
of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(undrip) as well as International 
Labour Organization (ilo) Conven-
tion 169 articles 6, 7, 14, and 15. 
During her visit to the island, 
Chilean President Bachelet began to 
respond in ways that suggest the state 
could be willing to consider a differ-
ent relationship with Rapa Nui, but 
analysis of her public statements also 
suggests further questions. In an April 
2016 speech, she acknowledged that 
“this island is the heritage of the Rapa 
Nui people,” yet she qualified that 
statement, adding: “but at the same 
time [the island is] national and world 
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heritage” and therefore “the responsi-
bility of all from wherever we come” 
(La Tercera, 30 April 2016). And in 
public forums, President Bachelet 
has emphasized that the government 
is working with conaf to develop a 
process to transfer administration of 
Parque Nacional Rapa Nui to an insti-
tution managed by Honui, but only in 
conjunction with codeipa (El Correo 
Del Moai, 1 May 2016). 
While it is encouraging to see the 
president foreground the island as 
first and foremost Rapa Nui cultural 
heritage, her qualification that vahi 
tapu are at the same time global and 
Chilean national heritage articulates 
with long-standing critiques of such 
heritage management plans as part 
of a broader “technology of govern-
ment” that undermines indigenous 
national identity formation (Smith 
2004, 10–13). Similarly, the form 
of park transfer suggested is also 
problematic given that in emphasiz-
ing co-administration by a Rapa Nui 
organization with codeipa—a state 
institution—the state proposes a 
“network created by the state” that 
can be seen as producing a “regula-
tory community” (Argawal 2005, 
92–94). Rather than enabling self-
determination of resources, a regula-
tory community replaces governance 
by a people themselves with gover-
nance distributed within a network 
of bureaucratic institutions and 
agencies determined by the state and 
other actors. As stressed in a letter to 
President Bachelet, Honui wants Rapa 
Nui to exercise their “inalienable right 
to self-determination of our natural 
and cultural resources according to 
law” (prn, 3 June 2016). The legal 
instruments Honui appeals to are not 
those of the violent Chilean lawscape. 
In a June 2016 letter to UN Special 
Rapporteur Tauli-Corpuz, Erity Teave 
emphasized that the Rapa Nui people 
pursue their human rights for self-
determination in terms of UN General 
Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541, 
article 73e of the UN Charter, and 
undrip.  According to undrip article 
31 (noted by UN Special Rapporteur 
Tauli-Corpuz above), “Indigenous 
peoples have the right to maintain, 
control, protect and develop their 
cultural heritage” and states are sup-
posed to “recognize and protect the 
exercise of these rights.” It does not 
say that states can qualify and dampen 
these rights through institutions 
like  codepia and broader agents of 
 regulatory  communities. 
Rapa Nui demands for rights to 
self-determination are consistent with 
other cases successfully supported by 
the iachr, like that of the indigenous 
Awas Tigni of Nicaragua, whom the 
Indian Law Center also helped repre-
sent (Coulter 2015), and the Rapa Nui 
people are currently working toward 
testing these rights in a legal case being 
developed for the iachr. In other 
words, Rapa Nui national  leaders 
continue to affirm their desire for 
“building a home in the space between 
justice and law” (Povinelli 2011, 14) 
in terms of their relationscape, rather 
than within the regulatory community 
the state wants authorized. 
forrest wade young
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Tonga
The new government of ‘Akilisi Pōhiva 
was tested to the limit by a number of 
political, economic, and policy issues 
after it came to power as a result of 
the 2014 election, the second under 
the amended 2010 constitution. For 
a reform-oriented government with 
minimal experience yet loaded with 
ambition and high expectations from 
the people, the stark reality of trans-
forming and modernizing a society 
steeped in conservative traditional 
values, under the patronage of a mon-
arch and a class of nopili (nobles), was 
a major challenge. Despite some of the 
institutional and symbolic reforms of 
the previous decade, some of the social 
issues of the previous era remained 
and frustrated plans for changes. One 
such issue was that of women’s par-
ticipation in politics, which is the main 
focus of this review. 
Although some progressive changes 
were made in the 2010 amended con-
stitution, remnants of the traditional 
patriarchal political culture persisted. 
For instance, no woman was elected 
to Parliament in the 2010 and 2014 
elections. This may appear ironic 
because under the cultural practice 
of vahu, women are traditionally 
accorded a unique social status within 
the kinship system, sometimes higher 
than men. (This is very similar to the 
Fijian practice of vasu, whereby one’s 
maternal link is considered special and 
sometimes more prestigious than one’s 
paternal inheritance.) However, politi-
cal power has always been a male 
enterprise, and before July 2016, when 
the first woman was elected to Parlia-
ment, males made up 100 percent of 
elected people’s representatives and 
100 percent of nobles representa-
tives—a record that placed Tonga at 
the lowest rung of the parliamentary 
gender diversity scale in the Pacific. 
The election of Ms ‘Akosita Lavu-
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lavu after a by-election in July 2016 
followed successes by a number of 
women in the local elections a couple 
of weeks earlier, a testimony to the 
intensification of campaigns by local 
civil society organizations, regional 
organizations, and international agen-
cies for greater awareness of women’s 
role in politics. Nevertheless, the path 
to gender consciousness and empow-
erment in Tonga has been fraught 
with challenges as forces of progress 
and conservatism continue to clash 
over what is appropriate for Tongan 
society. 
The tension between competing 
cultural and political discourses about 
gender was starkly manifested when 
the prime minister proudly told Parlia-
ment that his cabinet had agreed to 
ratify the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (cedaw) on 9 March 
2015 (see article by Helen Lee, this 
issue) and that Minister for Internal 
Affairs Fe‘ao Vakata, whose port-
folio included women’s issues, had 
informed the United Nations in New 
York about the ratification. What was 
meant to be a celebrated event turned 
sour as a clash between supporters 
and opponents of cedaw erupted 
immediately after the announcement. 
Pōhiva’s initiative was not surpris-
ing because he had been engaged 
in regional and international social 
activism as leader of the Tongan 
pro-democracy movement. Through 
this, he was actively involved in issues 
related to the nuclear-free Pacific, 
decolonization, human rights, and 
gender equality, among others. In 
many ways, these involvements further 
broadened his political and ideologi-
cal understanding of democracy and 
provided an alternative policy prism 
from that of previous prime ministers 
who, except for Dr Feleti Sevele, were 
largely drawn from the monarchical or 
the nopili class. 
The proposed ratification of cedaw 
was against the backdrop of the 
periodic review of the state of human 
rights in Tonga by the UN Human 
Rights Council’s Universal Periodic 
Review Working Group, completed in 
January 2013, which was critical of 
the status of human rights in Tonga 
(UN ohchr 2013b). When quizzed 
about gender inequality during an 
ohchr meeting in Geneva, Lord Vaea, 
the minister for internal affairs at the 
time, responded by pointing out the 
number of women employees in public 
and private institutions and prosecu-
tion of perpetrators of family violence. 
However, a number of countries were 
very critical of Tonga for not ratify-
ing cedaw (Fonua 2013). ohchr 
members recommended that concerted 
efforts be made to speed up gender 
equality and domestic violence laws 
and that ratification of cedaw should 
be a priority (UN ohchr 2013a). 
Because of concerns regarding what 
the ohchr saw as slow progress in 
ensuring basic freedoms in Tonga, the 
country became the first in the Pacific 
to undergo a second review; some of 
the recommendations from that review 
included provision of landownership 
by women, protection from domestic 
violence, better police training, and 
abolishing both the death penalty and 
corporal punishment. 
For a number of years, there has 
been a concerted campaign against 
family violence and for greater gender 
equality by civil society organizations 
such as the Tonga National Centre for 
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Women and Children, the Women and 
Children’s Crisis Centre, and Ma‘a 
Fafine Mo e Famili. The coordinator 
of the Ma‘a Fafine Mo e Famili, Betty 
Blake, campaigned for firmer action to 
promote women’s rights as well as to 
address some of the cultural impedi-
ments that undermine these rights; 
she urged the government to “look 
into women’s rights, our legislation 
and that government look into the 
new Family Bill that we are putting 
in” (rnz 2013). Even the Ministry for 
Internal Affairs, led by Chief Execu-
tive Officer Lopeti Senituli, a former 
social and political rights activist, 
effectively carried out consultation for 
the ratification of cedaw and passage 
of the Family Protection Act 2013, 
which among other things aimed to 
“prevent domestic violence and eco-
nomic abuse between family members 
and others in a domestic relationship” 
and “facilitate and maximise the 
safety and protection of persons who 
experience or fear domestic violence” 
(Government of Tonga 2013, 12).
In a roundtable organized as part of 
the cedaw consultation on 12 Feb-
ruary 2015, differences over cedaw 
began to emerge. While women civil 
society organizations and government 
departments such as the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Ministry of 
Health advocated for ratification, 
church leaders were vehemently 
opposed. During the exchanges, one 
of the faifekai (church ministers) 
shouted, “You women should know 
your place!” The head of the Talitha 
Project, which engaged in the develop-
ment of young women, expressed her 
dismay by retorting, “They (faifekai) 
are using the bible to say the male is 
the head of the family and they say to 
us don’t be selfish, women are under 
men—just be content where you are. 
They all know it is unfair. When they 
say there is no need to address the 
gaps. . . . I feel disgusted—absolutely 
disgusted” (Fonua 2015b). Arguably, 
one could say that these two positions 
represent the wide ideological gap in 
gender perceptions between tradition-
alists and progressives nationwide. 
Given the contending positions, 
the challenge therefore was how to 
ensure that the public understood 
what cedaw was all about and how 
to make it more relevant to Tongan 
culture. One of the sticking points 
was whether ratifying cedaw would 
mean changing relevant laws in Tonga. 
There were also reservations about 
certain articles in the convention that 
were interpreted as culturally insen-
sitive. In fact, in 2013, the Tonga 
government under Prime Minister 
Sevele had refused to ratify the con-
vention because of these reservations, 
especially articles 2 and 16 (discussed 
in more detail below), which, in a 
17 March 2015 letter to the editor of 
Matangi Tonga, Sevele argued were 
“in direct conflict with: a) some of the 
main provisions of our constitution 
and laws; b) some of our traditional 
customs and traditions; and c) some 
of our basic Christian doctrines.” In 
the same letter Sevele added, “The 
cedaw Convention is one from which 
our beloved country with our unique 
Constitution and ‘Tukufakaholo’ 
should keep well away” (Sevele 2015). 
This is quite an interesting position for 
someone so well educated. 
Opposition to the ratification was 
procedural, political, and cultural. It 
was pointed out by government legal 
experts that ratification of any inter-
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national convention was to be carried 
out by His Majesty in Council, not the 
prime minister, the cabinet, or Parlia-
ment. The parliamentary opposition 
used the opportunity to score points 
against the struggling Pōhiva govern-
ment. And outside Parliament, church 
leaders were mobilizing their largely 
Christian flock against what they saw 
as a fundamentally immoral and cul-
turally insensitive cedaw. 
Interestingly, this debate came on 
the eve of the twentieth anniversary 
of the Beijing Declaration and Plat-
form for Action, which was the main 
focus of the 59th Session of the UN 
Commission on the Status of Women 
held 9–20 March 2015 in New York. 
Tonga’s delegate to the Beijing confer-
ence was Queen Halaevalu Mata‘aho, 
the queen mother. This high-profile 
representation may have been politi-
cally and culturally symbolic, but it 
did not translate into transformation 
on the ground. 
In Tonga’s Parliament, debate was 
fierce as Pōhiva was quizzed about his 
intent and about whether the United 
Nations recognized Tonga’s reserva-
tions over some articles in cedaw. 
The prime minister finally succumbed 
to pressure and declared that the gov-
ernment was prepared to withdraw the 
ratification by suggesting that “we will 
write a letter” to the United Nations 
(Fonua 2015a). Pōhiva was reminded 
by another parliamentarian that once 
a country signs a convention, it is not 
possible to withdraw. 
Tonga was the only Pacific country 
where there were large-scale anti-
cedaw public protests. On 19 May 
2015, the Catholic Women’s League 
marched to Parliament to show its 
opposition to what it saw as an 
anti-Christian document. Three days 
later, a group of around five hundred 
people, organized by the churches, 
marched to the Palace Office and pre-
sented a petition with about 15,000 
signatures. The placards carried 
slogans such as “cedaw is a Secret 
Agent of Satan,” “cedaw = 666! 
Evil!”, “cedaw go to hell!” and one 
demanded, “‘Akilisi and your cabinet 
to step down!” (Matangi Tonga 2015).
The most contentious parts of 
cedaw were articles 2 and 16. Sec-
tion (f) of article 2 suggests that states 
should “take all appropriate measures, 
including legislation, to modify or 
abolish existing laws, regulations, 
customs and practices which consti-
tute discrimination against women.” 
This is reinforced by section (g), which 
urges states “to repeal all national 
penal provisions which constitute 
discrimination against women.” These 
provisions were seen as demanding 
changes in domestic laws and the 
constitution, a move that was felt to 
be potentially antagonistic to tradition 
and stability. There was a feeling that 
it was not proper to change local laws 
just to fulfill the demands of a “for-
eign” declaration. 
The interpretation of article 16, 
especially sections (b) and (h), was 
even more controversial. Section 
(b) talks of women and men having 
“the same right freely to choose a 
spouse and enter into marriage only 
with their free and full consent” and 
section (h) seeks to ensure “the same 
rights for both spouses in respect of 
the ownership, acquisition, manage-
ment, administration, enjoyment and 
disposition of property, whether free 
of charge or for a valuable consider-
ation.” Section (b) was interpreted by 
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critics as an endorsement of same-sex 
marriage and even marriage with 
animals, while section (h) was seen as 
a threat to the patriarchal system of 
domination relating to titles and land-
ownership, threatening the very core 
of Tongan political masculinity. 
The debates during kava bowl ses-
sions and in the public domain were 
quite robust and manifested a deep 
ideological division within the largely 
conservative society. Debates on social 
media including blogs involved both 
local and diasporic Tongans taking 
sides in very passionate and often 
personalized ways. Some denounced 
cedaw as anti-culture and anti-
religion as well as a slur on Tongan 
identity. cedaw supporters saw the 
convention as liberating for women 
from the patriarchal hegemony of 
traditional Tongan society. 
On 15 June, following the protests 
against cedaw and responding to 
public pressure, the king asked the 
government to annul the ratifica-
tion. The official statement by His 
Majesty in Privy Council was: “We 
remit to Our Ministers forthwith to 
proceed as may be necessary to annul 
the  Kingdom of Tonga’s signature or 
ratification of the cedaw Treaty”  
(tonganz.net 2015).
In a way, the debates on cedaw 
disprove a dominant myth about Ton-
gan society being ideologically homog-
enous. There are contending views 
about culture and identity that have 
shaped the political and cultural con-
tours of the country in both manifest 
and latent ways. Tonga’s transforma-
tion has been shaped by a number of 
interrelated and interdependent forces 
including Christianity, the monarchy, 
and traditional cultural values. Over 
the years, Christianity has helped to 
shape the moral and ethical prism 
through which Tongans see issues 
such as gender and human rights and 
it has often been used as justification 
for patriarchal dominance. cedaw is 
seen as anti-Christian because of its 
demand for gender equality, which 
is assumed to be against the biblical 
teaching of subservience of women. 
cedaw was also interpreted as anti-
thetical to constitutionally enshrined 
cultural practices such as male-based 
landownership, an important anchor 
of monarchic stability and power. 
With the failure to ratify cedaw, 
Tonga was back to square one in 
terms of formal recognition of gen-
der equality. However, despite this, 
changes have been noticeable at 
another level. Tongan women have 
been appointed to important govern-
ment and professional positions. For 
instance, in the Ministry of Finance 
and National Planning, although the 
minister and the chief executive officer 
are both men, the four deputy secre-
taries (who provide technical and pro-
fessional support in the areas of bud-
geting, project and aid management, 
policy and planning, and treasury) are 
all women. Other ministries, such as 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, are 
headed by women, and the number of 
women scholars and professionals has 
grown exponentially over the years. 
However, there was still concern 
over the lack of women’s participa-
tion in local and national politics 
in Tonga. To this end, a number of 
workshops and public campaigns were 
carried out by civil society organiza-
tions and the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. In April 2016, New Zealand 
mp Jenny Salesa, who is of Tongan 
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heritage, held a meeting in Nuku‘alofa 
for women interested in standing for 
local  government or parliamentary 
elections. Salesa told the more than 
fifty women who attended that “there 
had never been any female representa-
tion at local government level” and 
that even the three current women 
members of Tonga’s Parliament were 
appointed, not elected. She empha-
sized that “one of the biggest obstacles 
for Tongan women was themselves.” 
To illustrate her point, Salesa outlined 
what she heard on Radio Tonga after 
the 2014 elections: “I’d say about 
90 percent of the callers that were 
calling in to the radio station said 
along these lines: women’s place is in 
the home, women shouldn’t be heads 
of department, women shouldn’t 
be in parliament, women shouldn’t 
make decisions including in business 
or in parliament. But these 90 per-
cent were phone calls from women” 
(rnz 2016b).
The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
also organized workshops to encour-
age women to stand for the June 2016 
town and district officer elections. 
The ministry’s chief executive officer, 
Ana Bing Fonua, stated that they were 
looking at options and examples from 
around the region, including Sāmoa’s 
affirmative action steps toward 
promoting women’s participation in 
politics (rnz 2016a). 
The Women and Children Crisis 
Centre carried out a number of activi-
ties to promote gender equality as well 
as a campaign against family violence. 
For instance, in May 2016, it hosted 
a chant competition with the theme 
of “Peaceful and Happy Family,” 
which was won by Lapaha Govern-
ment Primary School, out of a total of 
eight government primary schools that 
 competed (Matangi Tonga 2016a).
On 16 June 2016, Tonga’s Ministry 
of Women’s Affairs and the Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade organized “a one-day National 
Women’s Forum to discuss the work 
done on a new National Policy on 
Gender and Development (npgd) 
2014–18, while mapping out a way 
forward to achieve its aims” (Matangi 
Tonga 2016b). The main focuses of 
the policy were family and social 
issues; unequal access to employment 
and productive assets; unequal politi-
cal representation and participation 
in decision-making; different vulner-
ability, roles, and capacity to respond 
to disasters and environmental and 
climate change not properly acknowl-
edged by national strategies; vulner-
able women; and the weak enabling 
environment for gender mainstream-
ing. The original policy, launched in 
December 2002, proclaimed that by 
2025, “all men, women, children and 
the families in Tonga should achieve 
equal access to economic, social, 
political and religious opportunities 
and benefits” (Ministry for Informa-
tion and Communications 2014). The 
June 2016 workshop was attended 
by representatives of government 
departments (including the Women’s 
Division of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, Tonga Police, and the Minis-
try of Finance) as well as representa-
tives from civil society organizations 
such as the Tonga National Centre 
for Women and Children, Women 
and Children Crisis Center, and Girl 
Guides (Matangi Tonga 2016b).
These campaigns seem to have 
worked wonders as, for the first time, 
two women were elected to local 
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government positions on 29 June 
2016. Sisifa Fili became the first-ever 
female district officer of ‘Eua Motu‘a 
district, and Vika Kaufusi was elected 
as town officer for Haveluloto. Four 
other women collected enough votes 
to secure second place, which enabled 
them to be eligible for positions as 
acting district officer for Hihifo Dis-
trict (Vava‘u) and town officers for 
Ha‘alalo, Ha‘atafu, and Matamaka, 
all in Tongatapu. A record 18 women 
stood as candidates in the local elec-
tions, including 11 in Tongatapu, 5 in 
Vava‘u, 1 in Ha‘apai, and 1 in ‘Eua.
On 14 July 2016, Akosita Lavulavu 
became the first Tongan woman ever 
to be elected into Parliament after a 
by-election in Vava‘u. The seat had 
been vacated by her husband, Etuate 
Lavulavu, former minister for tour-
ism, after he was convicted of bribery 
charges at the beginning of the year. 
Ms Lavulavu was the director of the 
‘Unuaki ‘o Tonga Royal Institute, a 
tertiary education provider. 
Despite the blanket opposition to 
cedaw, political consciousness among 
the people can be inspired in other 
ways. Grassroots mobilization has the 
potential to transform society from 
beneath the conservative hegemonic 
institutions such as the Church, the 
monarchy, and Parliament. During 
the year under review, Tonga has 
shown that this is not only theoreti-
cally conceivable but also empirically 
workable. 
steven ratuva
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